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Abstract 
The Centrality of Legitimacy and the Limits of the Small Footprint 
Approach to Military Operations 
 
Quinn David Sorenson, MPAff 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor:  William Charles Inboden 
 
War must be understood as it is, not as we wish it to be. This dictum of Carl von Clausewitz 
is as relevant today as it was in his time. Now, in the wake of 15 years of persistent low 
intensity conflict, policymakers argue over the application of military force in the 
contemporary threat environment. The Powell Doctrine advocates overwhelming force to 
ensure victory. Detractors, such as David Kilcullen, argue that overwhelming force in the 
current environment breeds host nation dependence and resentment among the people, and 
that a “small footprint” approach is more effective. I argue that neither an application of 
overwhelming force nor a commitment to a small footprint is appropriate under all 
circumstances. I argue for the centrality of legitimacy as the necessary objective, and that 
intervening forces, through a comprehensive strategy of regional engagement, can 
successfully legitimize an illegitimate regime using direct or indirect methods 
appropriately tailored to the context. I draw on two successful small footprint operations, 
the American engagement in the Philippines and the French Intervention in Mali, as case 
studies to define the characteristics of the regime, insurgency, and intervention that enable 
success.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I arrived at the district center to meet with the district sub-governor. I removed my 
body armor, placed my rifle in the front seat of my truck, and instructed my driver to 
monitor the radio. My platoon sergeant coordinated the security posture, assigned sectors 
of fire and established a guard rotation as my interpreter and I discussed my talking points. 
I developed the habit of removing my armor during meetings as a gesture of respect for the 
Afghan leadership. There was a growing tension due to recent allegations that the sub 
governor had solicited bribes and was engaged in other corrupt activities, and I felt it was 
important to communicate that I felt safe inside the district center where the Afghan 
National Police provided security. I feared the worsening of the relationship and the 
consequences it would have on security for the district, and I was convinced that I could 
still salvage it through personal diplomacy. After all, a week prior the sub-governor offered 
me a gift (a Russian made shotgun that I refused due to ethical considerations) and invited 
me to the wedding of one of his relations. Our friendship had cooled since then.  
I grabbed my hand-held radio, holstered my pistol, and my interpreter and I made 
our way toward the sub-governor’s office for our scheduled meeting. A young Afghan 
police officer assigned as a sort of domestic servant to the sub-governor invited me into 
the office and informed me that the sub-governor would be with me shortly. Under normal 
circumstances, the sub-governor would have greeted me personally. During our many prior 
meetings, his servant would provide chai tea and an assortment of dried chick peas, raisins, 
and candied almonds. On that day, traditional Afghan hospitality was conspicuously 
missing.  
Several minutes later, the sub-governor entered the room with four armed guards. 
He sat at his desk while guards flanked him at either side, and the remaining two stood 
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beside the door to effectively block my exit. It was clear that he intended to make me 
uncomfortable. My interpreter was visibly nervous. I greeted the sub-governor with the 
traditional Afghan greeting, placing my hand over my heart to demonstrate sincerity. He 
coldly reciprocated the gesture, and our meeting began.  
I informed him that I was suspending all funding for development projects due to 
allegations of corruption. The district was authorized a budget of $250,000 per quarter 
under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the primary program that US 
forces employed to fund reconstruction and development projects at the district level.  The 
conversation became heated, and he demanded to know what information I was basing my 
decision on. I feared for the safety of my sources, and I told him what I knew, careful not 
to reveal the origin of the information. Unbeknownst to him, I’d been collecting 
information on his various corrupt activities for weeks. 
My higher headquarters implemented a concept known as preferential bidding. The 
purpose of the program was to give the local government authorities greater control over 
the companies contracted to work inside their district boundaries. The central concept was 
that when a project was approved through the District Development Assembly (DDA), a 
democratically elected council to prioritize reconstruction efforts at the local level, 
companies that originated within the district would have an open bid while companies from 
outside of the district would participate in a closed bidding process. The idea was to 
maximize the benefit to the local community by hiring local companies instead of outside 
firms. In theory, it would significantly improve the economic conditions in the district. 
The sub-governor had unlawfully injected himself into the bidding process. 
Because of the competitive advantage afforded to local companies, several members of the 
DDA, and relatives of the sub-governor, quickly founded construction companies and 
attempted to participate in the bidding directly. The sub-governor, feeling that he was 
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positioned to determine winners and losers, began accepting bribes of $5,000 from 
contractors who wished to bid on contracts. These companies, hastily established to secure 
contracts believed to be guaranteed, lacked the expertise to fulfill the contracts they wished 
to compete for. The result of granting contracts to these companies would have amounted 
to a significant waste, would not have improved the lives of the local people, and would 
undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government by allowing government officials to 
exploit their positions of power for personal gain. It was antithetical to the idea behind the 
program. I now stood between him and his ability to make good on the promises that he 
made to these companies. The sub-governor promised contracts, and my refusal to enable 
his corruption undermined his position.  
 
 The sub-governor, through his corrupt actions, undermined the government’s 
legitimacy. Legitimacy was widely recognized as the ultimate objective of the 
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Field manual 3-24, the Army’s 
counterinsurgency manual states, “Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the 
government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.”1 The 
centrality of legitimacy as the overall purpose of the counterinsurgency campaign was also 
captured in mission statements at every echelon. According to our military doctrine, the 
central battle between the insurgency and the host nation is this struggle for legitimacy.2 In 
the situation above, the Taliban espoused a narrative of an illegitimate puppet government 
acting as an American client. The sub-governor’s actions confirmed the Taliban narrative.  
                                                 
1 Field Manual, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, (2006), 1-3. 
2 Ibid, 1-8. 
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 My predicament was certainly not a unique occurrence. To enhance the legitimacy 
of the government the U.S. Army focused on reconstruction projects, security, and 
economic development. These projects, as I alluded to earlier, flooded these districts with 
cash and brought extensive opportunities for corruption and challenges to establishing 
legitimacy. Through our efforts to legitimize the government, we opened the door for 
simultaneous de-legitimization. This unfortunate occurrence placed American military 
leaders in a precarious position where they had to choose between legitimizing the 
government’s leadership and pursuing what is ultimately best for the Afghan people, 
subject to their own judgment. The challenge inherent in intervention is precisely this 
question of legitimacy. Can an intervening force enhance the legitimacy of a third party? I 
argue that the United States can in fact enhance the legitimacy of a foreign regime under 
the appropriate circumstances. The question of a direct or indirect approach is subordinate 
to the objective of legitimacy. Strategists, however, must not allow a preference for a given 
means to influence a distortion of the necessary ends, nor can they overlook the 
significance of context in defining the means required to achieve those ends. 
The difficulty of legitimizing a host nation government through armed intervention 
has caused many in the defense establishment to advocate a more indirect approach. 
Colonel Gregory Wilson argues that a large military presence undermines the legitimacy 
of the intervention and prevents the nascent institutions from developing.3 The inference is 
that smaller interventions, intentionally designed to minimize the presence of foreign 
                                                 
3 Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF Philippines and the Indirect 
Approach,” Military Review, November-December (2006), 3. 
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troops are a more effective method for counterinsurgency operations. David Kilcullen, a 
prominent counterinsurgency theorist espouses what he refers to as the anti-Powell 
doctrine:  
Planners should select the lightest, most indirect and least intrusive form of 
intervention that will achieve the necessary effect. Policymakers should work by, 
with, and through partnerships with local government administrators, civil society 
leaders, and local security forces wherever possible.4  
 
 The intellectual impetus of minimizing the footprint of counterinsurgency or 
stability operations is given further credence by a combination of technological and 
political factors. Large footprint operations are costly in terms of blood, treasure, and 
political will. However, our current National Security Advisor, H.R. McMaster, castigates 
this trend toward minimalist thinking as an outgrowth of capabilities based analysis that 
seeks to define the operational environment as contingent upon American military strength 
independent of an honest appraisal of the threat. This line of thinking emerged after the 
overwhelming victory in the first Gulf War.5 On this point, Clausewitz is instructive saying, 
the first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and 
commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are 
embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien 
to its nature6  
The importance of understanding the war as it is, and not as we wish it to be, should lead 
us to reject analysis that does not account for the unique context of the crisis under 
consideration. This trend towards minimalism fails to ascribe agency to our adversaries, 
inadequately accounts for the context in which our forces must operate, and presumes that 
                                                 
4 Caroline Baxter et al, The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2012), 8. 
5 H.R. McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned,” Survival, 50 (2008): 19. 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.  
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through superior technology and training the United States military can dictate the form of 
the campaign.  
 Neither an application of overwhelming force nor a commitment to a small 
footprint approach is appropriate under all circumstances. We must understand the regime 
that we seek to legitimize, the insurgency that we seek to destroy or neutralize, and the 
regional context in which we seek to intervene. This borders on the obvious, but it must be 
understood that policymakers have failed to recognize the limits of American power in 
recent history. The initial commitment to the small footprint approach in Afghanistan is 
but one example of this. To this end, I argue that intervening forces, through armed 
intervention and regional engagement can legitimize a previously illegitimate regime using 
direct or indirect methods appropriately tailored to the context. I have conducted two case 
studies of successful small-footprint operations, French intervention in Mali in 2013 and 
the American intervention in the Philippines in 2002, to define the regime, insurgency, and 
intervention characteristics that enabled successful intervention. I do not imply that 
intervention is a panacea, in fact I intend to communicate the opposite. By illustrating the 
significance of contextual factors beyond the intervening power’s control, I intend to 
demonstrate the significance of understanding the operational environment and tailoring 
expectations and objectives to the appropriate context rather than to military capabilities 
and political intentions. 
My research finds that there is a relationship between government capacity and 
legitimacy. Both case studies confirm Stephen Watts findings in Countering Others’ 
Insurgencies: Understanding US Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context, that 
regime capacity determines the range of options available for prosecuting a 
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counterinsurgency strategy.7 Legitimacy is difficult for a regime to achieve if the regime 
relies on methods of coercion that undermine public support for the regime’s authority. In 
this respect, intervening forces can provide the additional capacity to ensure the regime has 
the tools and training necessary to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy that strengthens the 
regime’s claim to legitimate authority. 
In both Mali and the Phillipines, the host nation required the assistance of 
intervening powers to legitimize the government. This precedent of an external power 
enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation augurs well for American counterinsurgents. 
Here again, this depends on context and the specific role played by outside powers informs 
the limits of American intervention. In both cases, the interventions and the governments 
were made legitimate by the actions of regional power-brokers. In the case of the 
Philippines, both the insurgency and the government appealed to external powers to 
legitimize the peace process. In the case of Mali, the French leveraged Algerian diplomacy 
to legitimize the intervention and build regional support for the Malian government. In 
both cases, legitimizing the intervention and the regime required overtures by the regime 
and reconcilable elements of the insurgency and it must be understood that the interveners 
capitalized on these circumstances and did not manufacture them. Legitimacy was also a 
product of the ends to be achieved and should not be considered as an end in and of itself. 
Legitimacy must be inherent in the methods employed, accumulated throughout the 
intervention, and wisely stewarded if it is to be leveraged in favor of a peaceful resolution.  
In addition to the characteristics of the regime, certain characteristics inherent in 
the insurgency enable us to assess the likelihood of a resolution to the crisis. For example, 
the insurgency’s ideological orientation and ethnic identity significantly impact the 
                                                 
7 Watts, Stephen. Countering Others' Insurgencies: Understanding US Small-Footprint Interventions in 
Local Context, 28 
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likelihood of obtaining a negotiated settlement. In both case studies, multiple groups with 
varying aims competed for influence inside ungoverned spaces. Historic grievances of non-
representation in the body politic, and active violence against ethnic minorities, were the 
at the origin of both conflicts. In both cases, these groups rebelled and were infiltrated by 
organizations driven by Islamist ideology with broader jihadist agendas. These 
transnational jihadist groups did not share the political aspirations of the indigenous groups, 
and the policies pursued by the intervening force effectively exploited the asymmetrical 
aspirations. In order to identify the likelihood of achieving a negotiated settlement, the 
intervening power must recognize the distinction between transnational jihadist groups and 
local ethnic separatist groups. 
The vulnerability of the insurgency is also a function of terrain and disposition. 
Organizations arrayed in the local context and well-integrated into the community are 
much less vulnerable to interdiction. It follows that the ethnic separatist movements are 
more sensitive to maintaining legitimacy and were more willing to negotiate. Transnational 
movements, such as Al Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) relied on the 
tacit and active support of people who viewed them as foreigners. This distinction implies 
that the tacit support of the population is more tenuous for the transnational group than for 
the local group, and continued support of the transnational group is a critical vulnerability 
that the intervening power and the host nation can attack. Intervening forces can effectively 
exploit insurgent vulnerabilities and drive a wedge between local separatists and 
transnational terrorist organizations and catalyze resolution of the crisis. 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In order to effectively analyze the role of legitimacy in small footprint 
interventions, I must first clearly define the term small footprint intervention. An operation 
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is considered small footprint if the troop commitment is less than two security personnel 
per 1,000 inhabitants. This is determined by the national population and the total number 
of troops deployed to the host country. This measurement is drawn from a study conducted 
by Stephen Watts and Caroline Baxter at RAND Corporation and represents one tenth of 
the doctrinally prescribed strength of 20 personnel per 1,000 inhabitants.8 Small footprint 
operations can consist of active ground combat or they can be purely advisory.  
I approached my research by breaking down the factors of analysis into three broad 
categories: characteristics of the regime, characteristics of the insurgency, and 
characteristics of the intervention. With respect to the characteristics of the regime, I focus 
on capacity and legitimacy. To measure capacity, I analyze the ability of the regime to 
provide basic services and project military power, as well as the resilience of its institutions 
and the rule of law. I draw on the World Bank’s world development indicators to determine 
the availability of services. For proxy variables, I use kilowatt hours of electricity 
consumed per capita, percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation and 
water, and percentage of GDP spent on military expenditures. I approach the analysis of 
legitimacy from a more qualitative perspective. There are various definitions of legitimacy 
and consequently a variety of factors can be measured to assess it. Field Manual 3-24, 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, defines legitimacy as a society’s acceptance of 
authority consistent with societal norms and values.9 Paul Miller defines legitimacy 
similarly as broadly shared notions of justice that enable a state to rest its claims to power 
on broadly accepted norms.10 Legitimacy is critical to establish the authority of the 
                                                 
8 Caroline Baxter et al, The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 2012), 10. 
9 FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, (Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, 2006), 1-8. 
10 Paul Miller, Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press (2013) 42-44. 
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indigenous government, secure cooperation with intervening forces, and develop support 
for the institutions that will sustain the functions of the government after the departure of 
the intervening force. Both these definitions provide room for cultural context. It is 
ultimately the acceptance of a regime that confirms its legitimacy. I measure aspects of 
political inclusion, to include participation in electoral processes, adherence to formal 
agreements, and willingness to negotiate with the government as proxies to assess regime 
legitimacy. I acknowledge that these measures imply notions of legitimacy particular to 
western liberal democratic values. In these case studies, I believe this is consistent with the 
above definitions of legitimacy because both regimes possess parliamentary democratic 
systems of governance.  
I analyze insurgencies through two primary factors: a path to negotiated settlement 
and the vulnerability of the insurgency’s resources. To analyze whether there is a path to a 
negotiated settlement, I analyze the nature of the insurgency itself. While ideological 
predispositions will necessarily limit the space for political concessions, I distinguish 
between jihadist movements and primarily political movements. In both case studies, 
grievances initially rooted in issues of political inclusion and self-determination were later 
exploited by extremist groups. In both cases, the insurgent groups that expressed these 
grievances and renounced the broader jihadist agenda were, to a degree, reconciled. In 
contrast, the primarily jihadist groups espoused demands that rested outside the jurisdiction 
of the government. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Abu Sayyaf Group both 
espouse global jihad and establishment of sharia law. There is no room for reconciliation 
because the governments in question do not have the authority to grant such concessions 
without violating their obligation to their citizens.  
The second factor of insurgency to analyze is the vulnerability of the insurgency’s 
resources. Terrain and disposition greatly affect whether an insurgency can operate 
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autonomously. James Fearon and David Laitin argue that the rugged terrain in countries 
with poorly developed transportation networks, coupled with cross-border sanctuaries, 
results in conditions that can be exploited effectively by insurgents.11 The terrain 
effectively limits the government’s ability to influence the population or provide services, 
resulting in a population that can be exploited by an insurgency for tacit or active support. 
In this study, I look at the effects of terrain on the insurgent disposition. The strength of 
the insurgency’s network, ability to raise funds, and equip and sustain itself varies among 
groups. 
I analyze interventions through two factors: the role of intervening forces and the 
role of neighboring states. Small footprint interventions normally relegate the role of the 
intervening forces to either an observer or trainer role. Either of these roles decreases the 
likelihood of direct ground combat and emphasizes actions to increase the capacity of the 
host nation’s forces and provide support to operations. Intervening troops may provide 
specific enabling assets, such as intelligence collection or unmanned drones, provide 
operational advice, and train the indigenous forces in counterinsurgency and small unit 
tactics. Intervening forces can also act as the administrator. In this role, the intervening 
force administers some of the functions of the state directly, such as in  unilateral combat 
operations. As with intervening forces,  neighboring states play a critical role in facilitating 
negotiation and containing the insurgency with aggressive anti-terrorism measures. I look 
at the history of engagement, and any direct contributions to a negotiated settlement and 
troop deployments.  
 Taken together, analysis of these factors provides a contextual overview of 
conditions under which small footprint interventions can succeed. Chapter two consists of 
                                                 
11 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science 
Review, 97 (1) 2003, 80. 
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a review of the literature I consulted for this project. In chapter three I present a case study 
of American intervention in the Philippines. In chapter four, I present a case study of 
Operation Serval, the French intervention in Mali. I present conclusions and theoretical 
implications for future operations in chapter five.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
For this research paper, I consulted a broad variety of sources, including 
foundational works of theory, comprehensive works on state-building and small footprint 
operations, narrative works detailing the conduct of operations in Mali and the Philippines, 
and a wide variety of scholarly articles focused on various concepts relevant to my thesis. 
In this chapter I briefly discuss these works.  
DEFINING LEGITIMACY 
I relied heavily on the Army and Marine Corps field manual 3-24, Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency, to understand the concept of legitimacy as understood by the 
practitioners of small footprint operations. The authors broadly define legitimacy as a 
society’s acceptance of authority consistent with cultural norms and values. The authors 
point out that legitimacy is the ultimate goal of counterinsurgency. Legitimacy, that is the 
entity accepted by the people as the legitimate authority, enables control which will 
eventually enable reconciliation. All authority seeks to control a population through a 
combination of consent and coercion. The balance between these two elements is 
determined by norms and values. Conceptions of legitimacy are not static. The concept 
adapts with a culture and that culture’s perceptions of identity. Perceptions of group 
identity influence perceptions of legitimacy. The authors point out the changes in 
perceptions of identity following the American Revolution and Germany’s wars of 
unification, and how these wars re-defined notions of legitimate authority in profound 
ways. In my research, these shifts in perceptions of identity do influence legitimacy. I make 
observations in both case studies that conform to this understanding. The Army field 
manual also discusses the actions of an illegitimate government and the over-reliance on 
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methods of coercion. I draw on this understanding when analyzing the Marcos era in the 
Philippines. 
Robert Egnell’s article, “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’? A Critical Analysis of 
Counter-Insurgency Operations in Afghanistan,” questions the western-centric norms of 
establishing legitimacy through armed intervention. He theorizes that the “hearts and 
minds” approach is due to a uniquely western conception of the evolution of states. The 
conception of legitimacy comports well with western norms of political inclusion and 
securing the consent of the governed, but it fails to recognize that other societies may have 
other values and norms that place a lesser priority on consent than on respect for traditional 
authority and religious as well as cultural perceptions of the acceptable use of force. He 
further hypothesizes that insurgents have a decisive advantage because they are not 
imposing a foreign concept of legitimacy, but are reinforcing the traditional interpretation. 
This work has special significance in cultures governed by an ethno-centric moral code, 
such as the Pashto tradition of Pashtunwali. Egnell effectively argues for the necessity of 
understanding that the population bestows legitimacy on a government and intervening 
forces face a steep uphill battle if they intend to impose a foreign concept of legitimate 
authority. This work further informs the necessity of understanding context and developing 
operational and strategic objectives with an understanding of the limits imposed by the 
operational environment. 
In Building Peace After War, Mats Berdal writes that stability in post-conflict 
environments cannot be imposed but must be elicited. He articulates legitimacy as the 
critical component to stabilization. His conception of legitimacy is that it is not a simple 
calculation or something concrete that can be accrued or quantified. This comports well 
with the other works I cite in my research, that legitimacy is an abstract but necessary 
notion. His definition goes on to slightly modify the understanding of legitimacy stated in 
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the army’s field manual by declaring that legitimacy exists through a combination of self-
interest and “modes of social control” that can be translated into effective authority. What 
is most useful in his work is that he articulates the need for two considerations regarding 
legitimacy: the legitimacy of the intervention and the legitimacy of the host nation’s 
institutions. The emphasis on the legitimacy of the intervention is closely connected to the 
manner in which force is imposed on a society. The perceptions of the international 
community matter greatly at the initial stages of the intervention, but as the intervention 
moves forward, the conduct between the intervening forces and the population takes center 
stage. He cites American troops repeatedly interfering in the private lives of Iraqis through 
the imposition of overly aggressive search operations as a leading cause of shifting attitudes 
among Iraqis. This translates well to understating the Filipino government’s refusal to 
allow foreign troops to participate directly in combat operations and the virtues of the 
French limiting their role in Mali by incorporating indigenous troops as rapidly as possible. 
The legitimacy of the institutions empowered by the intervening force is also critical. The 
structures of governance encouraged, or installed, by intervening forces should be 
consistent with the values and norms of the people who must consent to its authority. Most 
importantly, Berdal demonstrates that these twin concepts of legitimacy must be 
considered at every stage of an operation. 
STATE-BUILDING AND COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY 
The foundation for my conception of state building operations is derived from Paul 
Miller’s book, Armed State-building. He addresses the various pathologies of state failure 
and proposes that there is no uniform sequence to be followed. His approach focuses on 
the correct diagnosis of the contributing causes to state failure and then adapting a strategy 
appropriate to those failures. He outlines five classifications of state failure: capacity, 
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prosperity, legitimacy, security, and humanity. While Miller’s work does not focus directly 
on small footprint operations, his classification of state failure and the approaches 
described can serve as guideposts for determining if a small footprint strategy is feasible. 
Miller describes the levels of intervention as Observer, Trainer, or Administrator roles. I 
argue that small footprint interventions can assume any of these three roles. It is not the 
role assumed that determines success or failure, but the appropriateness of the role. Miller’s 
work provides a sound basis for classifying state failures and forming strategies for 
intervention that are applicable to small footprint strategies.  
In Countering Others’ Insurgencies: Understanding US Small-Footprint 
Interventions in Local Context, Stephen Watts and a team of RAND researchers evaluate 
US small footprint operations. The authors identify the current operating environment and 
recognize the role of counterinsurgency and conclude that this type of warfare is distinct 
in its context dependence. It is this context dependence that American policymakers should 
pay attention to, as the researchers present glib data regarding the ability of the United 
States to influence foreign regimes to adopt strategies consistent with American interests. 
Specifically, the researchers find that 97% of insurgencies occurring since 1990 are fought 
by regimes within their own borders. Only 1 in 8 of these regimes possesses the capacity 
to implement western counterinsurgency practices. In this context, void of interference, 
these regimes typically do not seek to monopolize the legitimate use of force but seek 
bounded accommodation. The costs are simply too great for these regimes to dominate a 
rebellion with force. My thesis builds upon this concept of bounded accommodation by 
discussing the role of legitimacy in identifying and forcing compliance with negotiated 
settlements. 
The authors discuss government capacity and the potential pitfalls of using this 
metric to determine the success of an intervention strategy. Specifically, relying on 
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capacity and urging an incapable regime to undertake measures to improve capacity may 
cause the regime to stretch beyond its limits and undermine its own credibility. In my 
research, this exact phenomenon occurs in Mali. The Malian government sought power 
sharing arrangements that were deliberately inclusive and promised development. The 
inability of the government to deliver led to further discontent. The illusion of political 
representation and empty promises acted as one of the primary catalysts of the rebellion. 
In this sense, the authors model predicted government behavior.  
This work includes a case study of the Philippines upon which I heavily draw to 
outline the course of events. The relationship between state capacity, counterinsurgency 
approach, and the response of the insurgency is confirmed by other articles and reports 
consulted. The government in Manila closely follows the hypothesis with the evolution of 
its various strategies coinciding with improvements in capacity. My contribution to this 
research is that legitimacy goes beyond political inclusion to include the diplomatic and 
military efforts of foreign actors. 
In The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions, Caroline Baxter et 
al. argue that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused policymakers and military 
professionals to look for other methods of intervention. The small footprint approach 
appeals for three reasons. First, these interventions are more cost effective. Critics point 
out that the US spent approximately $100 billion per year in Afghanistan to eliminate a 
small portion of Al Qaeda fighters in a country with an annual GDP of $14 billion. Defense 
spending will always be in competition with domestic requirements and large scale 
operations with limited prospects for success are easily criticized. Second, smaller 
interventions are less likely to result in a nationalist backlash. Third, small footprint 
interventions are less likely to result in a relationship of dependence. The opposing 
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arguments are that small footprint operations will not exert effective control over 
indigenous allies and small interventions risk future expansion as failures mount.  
The authors theorize that operations in the developing world, particularly those 
occurring in failed or failing states, may often come down to a question of will. The defeat 
of such insurgencies does not necessarily occur inside the defined power dynamic that 
plays to American strength, in fact it frequently devolves to insurgent will dictating the 
uses of American power. In this case, strength alone cannot be considered to guarantee 
success and the failure of strong western powers to recognize this dynamic may explain 
how David is able to defeat Goliath. This theoretical contribution influences my thesis that 
legitimacy, in all its abstraction, is often the goal identified by western counterinsurgents. 
Those engaging in counterinsurgency would do well to recognize the absolute necessity of 
hard power and its contextual limitations and asymmetries.  
The study provides an elaborate discussion of the factors that influence the strategic 
approaches available to various regimes. Regimes that are less capable, less accountable, 
and less politically inclusive are much more likely to resort to violence. These regimes, 
lacking capacity to prosecute a western counterinsurgency model, ultimately erode 
legitimacy through these types of actions. I rely heavily on this work for the discussion of 
the Philippines, as the researchers’ thesis bears out in that conflict.  
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this work to my research is the 
systematic and thorough quantitative analysis of small footprint operations. The authors 
define the operational environments in which interventions have historically occurred and 
conclude that the size of the intervention is correlated with its environmental complexity. 
Lastly, the authors assert that small footprint stability operations lead to a denial of victory 
or negotiated settlement, but do not necessarily increase the odds of a military victory for 
the counterinsurgents.  
 19 
The authors conclude with three recommendations for improving the probability of 
success. First, circumstances matter. The United States, despite its vast power differential, 
cannot guarantee victory in every circumstance. This comports well with my thesis 
regarding the need for third party interventions to seek regional powers to enhance their 
own legitimacy and to approach the war with an understanding of its inherently political 
nature. Intervening powers cannot impose their will to achieve unconditional ends. War is 
participation in a political process that creates conditions for a negotiation that may bring 
about a more stable peace. Second, small footprint operations must be combined with the 
other tools of statecraft. Diplomacy, economic incentives or sanctions, and military action 
should be united in a common effort. My thesis goes beyond this to include the need for 
third party participation and legitimation. Finally, intervening forces must be committed to 
stabilizing the peace. Interventions, small footprint or otherwise, cannot succeed if the 
intervening powers are not willing to engage in the process and do what must be done. War 
is the unknown environment being continuously influenced by factors which may be 
unknowable. Success requires unwavering commitment. 
THE PHILIPPINES  
In The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia, Peter Chalk leads a team of 
RAND researchers to conduct a thorough analysis of various terrorist organizations 
operating in Southeast Asia. I draw on this research to better understand the composition 
and disposition of these elements. The study provides data on the various organizations 
vying for power in the Philippines and Indonesia, and discusses the origins of the Abu 
Sayaaf Group as well as the evolution of the Moro National Liberation Front into the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front. The researchers detail the domestic situation and the sources of 
support, as well as the shifting loyalties and the effectiveness of the Filipino armed forces 
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operating in conjunction with the US military. This work informs my theory of how 
insurgencies are ideologically guided, how this is balanced with economic and diplomatic 
concerns, and how these organizations array themselves in time and space. The authors 
provide a detailed account of perceptions in the communities in which these insurgencies 
operate, and this is critical to understanding the vulnerability of an insurgency. My 
discussion of the vulnerability of resources to interdiction is greatly informed by the 
understanding of how terror organizations in Southeast Asia are deliberately arrayed to 
remain outside the effective jurisdiction of the Filipino government.  
Peace at Last in the Southern Philippines provides a series of essays by prominent 
Filipino insurgent and government leaders who participated in the peace process. This 
document provides much of the history of the crisis in the Philippines. It begins with the 
Marcos era and ends with a framework resolution for peace. I draw on this document to 
discuss the effectiveness of diplomacy. This work supports my thesis regarding the 
significance of outside actors. The peace process entailed in this document occurred in 
Tripoli and Malaysia and provides a detailed account of the diplomatic hurdles that were 
overcome to bring these groups together. These authors conclude that the promising peace 
agreement coincides with the first time in history that the United States has led the 
international community to take a firm stance on the question of Moro autonomy in the 
Philippines. This work also reveals the highly pragmatic and political nature of the Moro 
separatist movement and demonstrates the limits of pure ideology. Moro separatists did 
find allegiance with more ideologically driven transnational insurgent factions, but these 
were alliances of convenience that were rapidly dissolved when a truly promising prospect 
of peace emerged. 
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MALI AND OPERATION SERVAL  
In The French War on Al Qa-ida in Africa, Steve Chivvis argues on behalf of the 
effectiveness of the French strategy. The French intervention, consisting of roughly 4,500 
French soldiers initially, deployed on extremely short notice and moved directly into 
combat against Islamist forces in northern Mali. He argues that the French acceptance of 
risk and maintenance of a high operational tempo were critical to the success of the 
operation, which succeeded in restoring Mali’s territorial integrity and put the insurgents 
to flight rather quickly. I rely heavily on Chivvis’s work to provide the timeline and details 
of the French intervention. 
Chivvis also discusses the French regional strategy. Inside Mali, the French 
deployed a comprehensive military effort that included airborne assaults that seized 
airfields, special operations forces that struck Al Qaeda targets, and conventional forces 
that secured major population centers and conducted large scale clearance operations to 
destroy what remained of the insurgency. Despite the comprehensive nature of the military 
action, French diplomatic efforts ensured that France would not be solely responsible for 
the administration of the peace. The United Nations provided a peacekeeping force 
consisting of African soldiers from neighboring states. The EU committed to a long-term 
police and military training program designed to increase the capacity of Mali, and the 
French have been able to withdraw significantly from Mali and maintain a broader regional 
strategy of containment.  
Chivvis’s work informs my thesis regarding the role of neighboring states and the 
role that the intervening forces will fulfill. Regional diplomacy ensured that other African 
nations engaged in direct combat side by side with French soldiers, and the consensus 
developed into a long-term commitment to eradicating extremist organizations from North 
Africa. These efforts led to success in Mali and provide a model that can be adapted, 
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context dependent, to other interventions. Mali is undoubtedly safer than it would be 
without the French intervention, and the intervention with a deliberate exit strategy 
prevented a quagmire and preserved French legitimacy for future operations throughout 
the wider region.  
In addition to Chivvis, French Lieutenant General Olivier Tramond and Lieutenant 
Colonel Philippe Seigneur authored an article in Military Review titled, “Operation Serval: 
Another Beau Geste of France in Sub-Saharan Africa?” The authors provide an overview 
of French operations in Mali from the French operational perspective. I rely on this source 
for the French operational details and to provide additional context. 
In “Confronting AQIM in the Sahel: The Malian Crisis,” Djallil Lounnas writing 
in the Journal of North African Studies reveals the significance of Algeria’s role in the 
French intervention in Mali. The author outlines the importance of this relationship in 
facilitating and legitimating the French intervention. Algeria’s contributions were critical 
to success for four reasons. First, Algeria understands AQIM and has a long history of 
successfully containing the terrorist group. AQIM originated in Algeria and the Algerian 
government prosecuted a regional strategy that effectively contained AQIM for years until 
the Arab Spring weakened Algeria’s previously cooperative neighbors. Second, Algeria 
had legitimacy with the Malian government and the various factions competing for power 
in the ungoverned spaces of northern Mali. The various factions had been engaged in 
Algerian hosted negotiations just prior to the intervention. The Algerians astutely parsed 
the aspirations of ethnic Tuaregs from the more threatening regional and global agendas of 
more extreme groups. Third, Algeria is viewed as a competent and valuable regional 
partner. Algeria emerged from the Arab Spring with its government intact and functional. 
It is undoubtedly a developing state, but the crises of legitimacy that plagued the rest of the 
region seemed to bypass the Algerian government. Finally, the history between France and 
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Algeria places Algeria in a unique position to legitimize French intervention. Algerian 
condemnation of the intervention could have eroded French legitimacy. The acquiescence 
and cooperation of the Algerians strengthened French claims to legitimacy. This work is 
consistent with my thesis that legitimacy, in all its abstraction, can be generated in a variety 
of ways. In Mali, the host nation government suffered from a crisis of legitimacy that has 
been temporarily allayed by the actions of capable and legitimate neighbors and backed by 
French military superiority.  
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Chapter 3:  Philippines – Case Study 
Those in the defense and military establishment who advocate for a small footprint 
approach to stability operations frequently cite American intervention in the Philippines as 
a model for wider implementation. The strategy in the Philippines consisted of a small 
contingent of Americans, mostly Special Operations Forces, that built the capacity of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), conducted civil-military operations that included 
medical civil action programs and minor infrastructural improvements to build trust 
between the people and the AFP, and conducted information operations to influence the 
population in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP).12 The 
appeal of this operation is the limited cost in terms of blood and treasure and the 
empowerment of the GRP to conduct its own war. 
This intervention is significant for many reasons. First, it is an example of a 
successful small footprint operation. The operation is consistent with the doctrine of 
foreign internal defense (FID) that directs every action be conducted by, with, and through 
the host nation government and security forces. Second, the Government of the Republic 
of the Philippines (GRP) is a democratic government with western institutions and norms 
of oversight, a restrained executive, and a capable military establishment. These factors 
predispose the GRP to conduct counterinsurgency in a manner that is consistent with 
Western norms.13 Third, the threat in the Philippines is multi-faceted and characterized by 
divergent interests ranging from territorial autonomy to the establishment of a theocratic 
state.14 The diplomatic and military navigation of these competing interests can provide 
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insight for the settlement of future conflicts. Finally, the Government of the Republic of 
the Philippines (GRP) failed to establish itself as legitimate through its own actions, but 
over time the increased capacity of the regime and outsourcing of negotiations to 
neighboring states significantly improved the GRP’s prospects of establishing broadly 
shared norms of justice. The primary insurgent actor, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 
also elicited the assistance of an external actor to further legitimize the peace process. This 
case study establishes both the importance of understanding context and the central role of 
legitimacy in securing a negotiated resolution to hostilities. 
The success of this operation was highly contingent on the characteristics of the 
state and the threat. In Countering Other’s Insurgencies, RAND researchers determine that 
the ideal conditions for successful operations, such as host nation government capacity, 
political inclusion, and professional military capability, were prevalent in the Philippines.15 
The authors also comment that the circumstances in the Philippines have rarely been 
replicated in the history of American small footprint operations, and it is a mistake to 
assume that the success of this operation directly translates to success in less promising 
environments. In this case study, I intend to analyze the characteristics of the governing 
regime, the threat, and the intervention to clearly identify the centrality of legitimacy as 
well as the context that enabled success in the Philippines. 
BACKGROUND 
Islamic separatist movements in the Philippines and the actions of the Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) can be understood in three distinct phases. First, 
the election of Ferdinand Marcos and his subsequent declaration of martial law in 1972 
reveal a heavy-handed militaristic approach to counterinsurgency. This approach is 
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indicative of a regime that lacks the capacity to deliver services, train an adequate military 
force, prosecute a competent counterinsurgency strategy, and the legitimacy to act in good 
faith to compel a negotiated settlement. Second, the subsequent administrations of Corazon 
Aquino and Fidel Ramos indicate a shift in strategy to adopt a more conciliatory approach. 
Aquino would articulate a multi-phased counterinsurgency strategy that closely resembles 
the American “Clear, Hold, Build” model. She would also offer amnesty and reintegration 
for Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fighters as a conciliatory effort.16 Despite her 
attempts at reintegrating Muslim separatists, the lasting memory of martial law under 
Marcos, combined with an inability of the government to deliver the services and 
development, undermined her efforts. Fidel Ramos would extend Aquino’s programs of 
amnesty and reintegration and in 1992 he secured an agreement with the MNLF that did 
remove some military forces from the battlefield. Despite this early success, the Ramos 
regime would inherit the bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption that limited the 
effectiveness of the Aquino regime’s counterinsurgency strategy. It was also during 
Ramos’s term that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) became more influential, as the reintegration incentives appealed mostly to the 
MNLF leadership and left the more hardline Islamists to seek another venue for Moro 
independence.17 Third, the GRP strategy from 2001 to the present date can be described as 
an implementation of a classical counterinsurgency model. As the GRP improved in 
capacity, legitimacy, and military competence, the subsequent regimes, in coordination 
with the United States, have heavily invested in development and civil-military 
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operations.18 This approach has led to a promising peace agreement with the MILF and 
reduction in the effectiveness of the ASG.  
1965-1986, Martial Law and the Rise of the Moro National Liberation Front 
The seeds of conflict between the Roman Catholic majority in the Philippines and 
the Islamic Moro minority, residing primarily in the south, were planted centuries ago. Two 
factors influenced the direction of Moro relations with the GRP during the Marcos regime. 
First, the alleged execution of Muslim Filipino army recruits on Corregidor island in what 
came to be known as the Jabidah Massacre. Second, the Ilaga movement, a Christian militia 
group, that committed acts of harassment and terror against Muslims in Mindanao. This 
group reportedly executed 65 men, women, and children in a mosque in June of 1971.19  
The violence against Muslims in Mindanao and elsewhere awakened the collective 
consciousness of Muslim Filipinos and drove many young Muslim men into the arms of 
the Moro National Liberation Front.20 The increase in support for the MNLF, as well as 
the communist insurgency raging elsewhere in the Philippines, led Ferdinand Marcos to 
declare a state of martial law in 1972, effectively installing himself as a dictator. He would 
rule the Philippines until his ouster in 1986.  
President Marcos’ approach to counterinsurgency was predictably heavy handed. 
He expanded the size of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from 60,000 to 
157,000. His regime lacked the administrative capacity and legitimacy to secure a 
negotiated settlement and subsequently focused on coercion and force, which further 
eroded the regime’s legitimacy. The actions of the regime would indicate little interest in 
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reconciliation or negotiated settlements of any kind.21 In his war against the MNLF, Marcos 
employed the professional Filipino forces as well as poorly trained militias. From 1969-
1976, these actions resulted in approximately 60,000 killed, 54,000 wounded, and as many 
as 350,000 displaced.22 Marcos’s war against the Muslim population was not strictly 
military, he also attempted to marginalize Muslim influence in Mindanao by encouraging 
Christians to purchase land, settle in Mindanao, start businesses, and run for office in an 
attempt to relegate the Moro people to minority status in their ancestral homeland.23 
Marcos also controlled the political elections in Mindanao and, in some cases, 
disempowered incumbent Muslim leaders and installed Christian officers in their stead.24  
Fighting between the Marcos regime and the MNLF temporarily ceased as a result 
of the 1977 Tripoli agreement, whereby the GRP acknowledged the Moro right to self-
determination and both parties agreed to settle the issue of autonomy by referendum at a 
later date.25 The agreement was not adhered to by either the MNLF or the GRP, it was 
abandoned and fighting resumed.26 Mutual suspicion and distrust, a result of the violation 
of societal norms of justice, then undermined the foundation of legitimate government 
action and increased the difficulty that both the MNLF and GRP faced in securing 
adherence to the peace agreement. Disagreement over the outcome of the Tripoli peace 
talks led to a split within the ranks of the MNLF. Many MNLF members viewed the delay 
of the question of autonomy as a betrayal to the cause of Moro independence. Mistrust 
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between MNLF members who were willing to settle and those who believed the GRP could 
not be trusted led to the foundation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984.  
1986-2001, Reconciliation and Discontent 
In 1986, with the election of Corazon Aquino as President of the Philippines, the 
prospects for a negotiated settlement between the MNLF and the GRP greatly improved. 
Aquino pursued a conciliatory strategy and offered terms of reintegration and amnesty to 
MNLF members who were willing to lay down their weapons. Aquino’s counterinsurgency 
strategy consisted of a greater emphasis on delivering services, economic development, 
and winning the support of the people in addition to intelligence driven combat operations. 
Additionally, the AFP underwent training that emphasized human rights and population 
centric operations. In practice, this renewed emphasis on classical counterinsurgency fell 
short of expectations. The GRP lacked much of the necessary administrative capacity to 
deliver on the promises of development, and intelligence driven operations were more 
wishful thinking than reality given the scarce resources of the AFP.27  
In 1989, the Aquino government reached an agreement to create the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) through a referendum in the affected provinces in 
accordance with the 1977 Tripoli agreement. The referendum had poor results, with only 
four of the thirteen provinces electing to participate in the ARMM. The memory of 
Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law caused many Muslims to harbor significant skepticism 
towards the Manila regime.28 Muslim discontent with the MNLF is expressed during this 
period with the rise in the prevalence of the more extreme separatist movements, the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The MILF swelled to 
an estimated 11,000-15,000 fighters armed with 7,700 weapons, to include rifles, grenade 
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launchers, machine guns, anti-tank munitions, and anti-personnel land mines.29 The ASG 
was founded during this period by Khadaffi Janjalani in response to the softening stance 
of the MNLF and the MILF.30 Janjalani traveled extensively throughout the Arab world 
and was educated in Saudi Arabia. He was also a personal friend of Osama Bin Laden and 
a participant in the Afghan campaign against the Soviets. He intended to bring Wahabbist 
zeal to the Moro movement in South East Asia.31 During this period, the ASG was 
responsible for 378 terrorist attacks that killed 288 civilians and kidnapped 2,076 people 
for ransom. 
In 1998, Fidel Ramos was replaced by Joseph Estrada, who delegated responsibility 
for the overall strategy to the Filipino armed forces. In 2000, Estrada declared war against 
the MILF leading to significant displacement of persons and a reversion to the fighting of 
previous administrations.32 Ramos undermined the previous administration’s attempts to 
reintegrate reconcilable Moros. 
2001-Present, Classical Counterinsurgency and American Assistance 
Estrada was deposed in 2001 and Gloria Arroyo, the Vice President, assumed the 
position of President of the Philippines. Presidential elections were held in 2004 and 2010 
and peaceful transitions of power eventually  became normalized, boding well for the 
adoption of more population-centric counterinsurgency measures. The GRP committed to 
a negotiated settlement with the MILF but considered the ASG a terrorist organization and 
did not offer amnesty or reintegration to the ASG.33  
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During this period, the United States considered the Philippines a front in the 
Global War on Terror. American involvement was relegated to the southern Philippines 
and focused primarily on targeting the ASG and American interests in the War on Terror. 
US forces are still forbidden to participate in ground combat, but they were instrumental in 
providing intelligence support and training to the AFP. The American presence coincided 
with a greater emphasis on human rights, protection of civilians, development, and 
precision targeting of insurgent personnel and resources. These operations have been 
highly successful, reducing the strength of the ASG to approximately 250 fighters and 
creating the conditions for a lasting peace with the MILF.34 
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT 
Small footprint interventions are more likely to succeed if the intervention can 
generate legitimacy for the state without undermining its precarious position. Because 
capacity and legitimacy are linked, I consider both here. In the case of the Philippines, there 
is significant improvement in both capacity and legitimacy throughout the various 
administrations, and these improvements coincide with shifts in the strategy pursued.  
Capacity 
Per capita electric power consumption measures the amount of electricity 
consumed by the population. This includes electricity that is generated locally for domestic 
consumption as well as for manufacturing and industry. Higher consumption indicates 
improvement in the quality of life, and greater governmental capacity to manage, construct, 
and collect payments for energy consumed. During the Marcos era, electric power 
consumption averaged 325 kilowatt hours per person. In the time period from 1986-2001, 
consumption increased to 396 kilowatt hours per person. The average for the last period 
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under consideration, 2001 to the present, consumption has skyrocketed to 602 kilowatt 
hours per person.35  
The percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation and water 
sources has undergone similar changes over the periods in question. From 1986-2001 the 
average percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation was 60.8% while 
in the latest era, 2001 to the present, this number has increased to 69%. Likewise, for access 
to clean water the numbers have increased from 85.6% to 89.7%.36 While specific data for 
these two indicators is not available for the first period under consideration, overall poverty 
data is. The poverty headcount ratio measures the percentage of the population that lived 
on less than $1.90 per day. For the Marcos era, 28.08% of the population lived at or below 
this measure. This number was reduced to 22.5% from 1986-2001 and has taken an even 
more dramatic reduction in the last period to 14.59%.37 This measure doesn’t illuminate 
government capacity with regard to services delivered, but it does provide an understanding 
of the improved standards of living. 
The final indicator for capacity measures the percentage of GDP spent on military 
hardware and personnel. During the Marcos regime, this data is not available. Though we 
do know that he increased the size of the Filipino military dramatically, from 60,000 to 
more than 150,000, and his regime was actively involved in a costly and brutal war. A 
study commissioned by the RAND corporation states that military spending under Marcos 
peaked in 1982 at $909,000,000, which was 14 times the amount spent on military 
expenditures during Marcos’ first year in office.38 For the period from 1986 to 2001, the 
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GRP spent 2.007% of GDP on military expenditures compared to just 1.29% for the last 
era. This decrease in military spending as a percentage of GDP must be taken in light of 
the economic growth during this period. Nonetheless, the burden of maintaining a military 
was reduced which allowed for greater spending on domestic affairs. This reduction in the 
burden imposed by military spending also came at a time when the AFP was focused on a 
classical counterinsurgency campaign built on a model that was recognizable to western 
powers. The AFP have been augmented with American intelligence collection capabilities 
as well as training. The AFP also abandoned their previous attempts to coerce the 
insurgents, and embraced a philosophy of development and security. The force was better 
trained, more appropriately equipped, and more cost effective than it was during the 
Marcos era. 
Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the ruling regime is difficult to assess. Marcos’s actions against 
the Islamic south, political gerrymandering in Catobato and his attempts to manipulate the 
demography of the Moro region empowered the growth of the MNLF and exacerbated 
historic ethnic tensions in a manner that would take decades of diplomatic work to 
correct.39 For an ostensibly democratic regime to be considered legitimate, there must be a 
reasonable belief in executive restraint, political inclusion, and resilient institutions. 
Dictatorships that lack capacity and rule of law are rarely considered legitimate, and this 
lack of legitimacy limits policy options and frequently results in greater atrocity and further 
reductions of legitimacy.40 The restoration of legitimacy in the Philippines brought the 
MILF to negotiate with the GRP. This was achieved through concerted diplomatic efforts 
of Marcos’s successors. 
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Marcos’s attempt at legitimacy culminated in the Tripoli talks in 1976, whereby the 
GRP acknowledged the Moro right to self-determination.41 The agreement fell apart almost 
immediately, as the MNLF and the GRP both violated the terms of the agreement. The 
mistrust between the Moro people and the GRP led to the rejection of the Tripoli agreement 
and the broad acceptance of a more radical organization. The MILF was officially founded 
in 1984 to fulfill the vision of an Islamic state in South East Asia. Hashim Salamat, one of 
the founding leaders of the MILF is quoted as saying, “autonomy will not work . . . It will 
only be manipulated and controlled by the Manila government . . . Only the full 
independence of the Bangsamoro people with an Islamic state will solve the problems of 
Mindanao.”42 The illegitimacy of the actions of the GRP led to a deep mistrust that 
prevented a rapprochement and led to further radicalization that would bedevil multiple 
GRP administrations.   
President Corazon Aquino assumed office in 1986 and sought to reinvigorate 
negotiations with the Muslim separatist groups in the south. She offered promises of 
reintegration and amnesty to MNLF fighters. Legitimacy is not solely a measure of the 
president’s willingness to negotiate, it is also the people’s perceptions of the institutions 
that will carry out her orders. In the case of president Aquino, the military still had many 
officers loyal to the policies of Marcos, and she made little headway in her attempts to 
negotiate.43 She saw this failure, and initiated reforms within the military and the 
supporting institutions, but it would take time to establish the trust necessary for a 
meaningful negotiation. In order for norms of justice to be realized, and broadly shared, a 
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consistent pattern of government behavior must predictably conform to culturally 
appropriate norms of justice. Aquino did, however, succeed in pushing forward the 
referendum on the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) but, due to the 
previously stated lack of trust, only four of the thirteen eligible provinces and cities voted 
in favor.44 Furthermore, at the time the plebiscite was conducted, violations of the Libya 
cease-fire agreement between the MNLF and the government were occurring with 
increased regularity and there were multiple coup plots against the Aquino 
administration.45 This overture, and subsequent rejection by the Moro people, indicate the 
importance of trust and credible belief in the ability of the established powers to deliver on 
negotiated settlements. The insurgents had little reason to find Aquino credible. 
Fidel Ramos ascended to the presidency in 1992 and continued Aquino’s policies 
of reconciliation, but took greater efforts to increase the legitimacy of his government. He 
did two things immediately to repair the damaged reputation of the government. First, he 
repealed an anti-subversion law to enable previously identified “subversive” organizations 
to pursue their social and political aims in a non-violent manner.46 This legislation had 
previously been a roadblock to progress. Despite the lofty rhetoric of president Aquino, 
this anti-subversion legislation empowered the institutions of the government to interpret 
prior actions as subversive and this blocked the participation of many who desired sincere 
reconciliation. Second, he created a program to reintegrate and disarm former rebels.47 This 
program allowed former MNLF fighters to exchange their weapons for money and 
participate in job-training and other livelihood enhancing programs. These proposals 
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secured a negotiated settlement with the MNLF in 1996, “The Final Mindanao Peace 
Agreement,” that broke a decades long diplomatic impasse.48 Despite these successes, the 
institutions and bureaucracy of his government were still perceived as weak, corrupt, and 
inefficient, and while the MNLF and the NPA (Communists) negotiated, or were thwarted, 
the more extreme elements of the Muslim separatist Moro movement continued to thrive 
and refused to accept the government’s overtures as sincere. During his tenure, the MILF 
and the ASG both increased in numbers and influence in Mindanao.49  
The progress of Aquino and Ramos was largely reversed by Ramos’s successor, 
Joseph Estrada, who escalated combat operations against the Moro separatists, which led 
to significant civilian casualties and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos.50 
He gravely miscalculated the center of gravity with his scorched earth tactics, and 
empowered the MILF and the ASG by driving moderate Muslims in Mindanao into the 
arms of extremists.51 The delicate work of establishing the regime’s legitimacy was 
recklessly undermined by a return to hostilities, confirming the suspicions of the more 
extreme elements and isolating the moderate insurgent leaders who sought a genuine 
reconciliation. 
In 2001, the people deposed Estrada in a popular uprising and replaced him with 
the Vice President, Gloria Arroyo. Arroyo understood the significance of legitimacy in her 
actions and in the actions of the institutions of power. Estrada’s fall from grace drove this 
point home, as it was the accusations of rampant corruption and incompetence that caused 
the loss of confidence and ultimately led to his ouster. She was determined to seek a new 
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course for the negotiations with insurgent groups. Recognizing the crisis of credibility, she 
appealed to Malaysia, a Muslim majority country, to mediate the peace talks with the 
MILF. The initial response was promising, as both the AFP and the MILF suspended 
military actions in good faith on April 3, 2001.52 This decision acknowledges that the 
suspicion and distrust that insurgent groups harbored toward the GRP was legitimate, and 
by appealing to Malaysia, the GRP provided a degree of separation from the peace process 
that demonstrated sincerity. The GRP could not legitimize itself because the relationship 
was too precarious and fraught with a history of mistrust and skepticism. Malaysia was 
critical to legitimizing the peace process. 
The advent of the War on Terror introduced a new dynamic to the peace 
negotiations. Opportunistic MILF leadership recognized American involvement in the War 
on Terror as an opportunity to secure the support of a major western power as a method to 
pressure the GRP to make meaningful concessions. The MILF moderated its call for full 
independence, and adopted a more conciliatory tone, appealing to President George W. 
Bush directly in a letter composed in January, 2003, extolling the United States as a “great 
champion of freedom and democracy” and committed to a negotiated settlement with 
Washington at the table. The MILF later fully renounced the use of terrorism in this letter.53 
These actions were noticed in Washington, and President Bush would recount his 
correspondence with the MILF leadership at an address he delivered to the Filipino 
congress. These events taken together, the introduction of a neutral third party sympathetic 
to the insurgency, and the interest of a high-profile western partner, the United States, led 
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to a series of talks that resulted in a framework agreement and a negotiated settlement.54 
Peace in the southern Philippines looks more promising now than at any time in the last 40 
years. 
These factors taken together indicate a government that was progressing towards 
greater capacity and legitimacy. During the Marcos era, the government lacked the ability 
to deliver services and this coincided with the movement towards dictatorship and heavy 
handed counterinsurgency strategy. The subsequent efforts at political inclusion of the 
insurgent groups required both the institutional capacity to deliver services and manage the 
affairs of state as well as the ability to build trust and confidence in the intentions of the 
government and its institutions. It was ultimately the influence of the United States and 
Malaysia that ensured the legitimacy of the GRP’s peace process. Malaysia acted as an 
impartial mediator and the United States was leveraged by the MILF to ensure the good 
behavior of the GRP. All told, as capacity and legitimacy increased, the country moved 
towards a western counterinsurgency model and abandoned the more authoritarian 
practices of the Marcos era. Because the regime was sufficiently capable and perceived as 
legitimate, the modest contributions of the US intervention were highly effective at 
isolating and destroying the narrow extremist elements by, with, and through the GRP. 
 ANALYSIS OF THE INSURGENCY 
I analyze two specific questions regarding the insurgency itself. First, for small 
footprint operations to be a viable option there must be an apparent path to a negotiated 
settlement. The concept of legitimacy, previously applied to the regime, applies to the 
insurgency as well. The MILF insurgency exercised control over military forces and 
governance, and the ability to enforce adherence to cease-fire agreements, censure rogue 
                                                 
54 Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim et al., “Peace at Last in the Southern Philippines? The Framework Agreement on 
the Bangsamoro,” 636-8. 
 39 
elements, and organize operations indicates that the MILF capitalized on shared norms of 
justice within the Moro community to enhance its own legitimacy.  
As a matter of strategy, the government and the intervening force should seek to 
distinguish between reconcilable and irreconcilable insurgents to identify this path to 
negotiation. In the case of the Philippines, this was a key component of the GRP strategy. 
The GRP and the intervening US forces effectively targeted the extremist elements of the 
insurgency and increased the space for negotiation and reconciliation.55 Second, insurgent 
vulnerability to interdiction is determined by disposition and terrain. In the case of the 
Philippines, the terrain favored the insurgency because the restrictive nature of the terrain 
denied government influence and strengthened the ties between the MILF and the Moro 
people.56 MILF disposition exploited the advantages of terrain and the disposition of forces 
made this advantage concrete by allowing the MILF to solidify control and reduce the 
influence of transnational forces with aspirations beyond Moro independence.  
The American intervention in the Philippines is concerned primarily with two 
insurgent elements, the MILF and the ASG. These two insurgencies have at times 
cooperated, though their intentions and aspirations differ significantly. For this reason, they 
will each be dealt with separately here. 
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
The MILF path to a negotiated settlement is observable for three distinct reasons. 
First, the movement is primarily an ethnic movement concerned with legitimate grievances 
regarding the right to self-determination. While other groups have temporarily allied 
themselves with the MILF, such as the ASG or the MBG, the MILF has continuously 
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prioritized the immediate political goals of independence for the Moro people. Second, the 
movement is perceived by its adherents as largely legitimate. The MILF commands 
significant respect among the people of Mindanao and is rooted in a tradition of ethnic and 
religious solidarity. The legitimacy of this movement can be observed by the consistent 
unwillingness to involve itself in transnational matters and the tacit and active support of 
the Moro people during times of conflict. The organization has generally refrained from 
terrorist tactics and the targeting of civilians or critical infrastructure, which increases their 
legitimate appeal beyond the Moro ethnic group.57 The organization also possesses 
significant military credibility, as evidenced by the 11,000 Moro men at arms and a 
significant arsenal that has proven capable of continuous guerrilla warfare against a 
superior force.58 This military strength also indicates an acceptance of legitimate use of 
force by the Moro people. Third, the movement has a history of diplomatic concessions to 
secure more favorable outcomes.59 The organization emerged in response to the brutal 
execution of Muslims and did not waver in the insistence of a permanent political solution. 
Although the aspirations migrated from autonomy, to full independence, to an eventual 
acceptance of autonomy, these diplomatic shifts should be understood in light of the actions 
of the GRP and not as unilateral political adjustments on behalf of the MILF. When 
conditions enabled diplomatic concessions, the MILF proved to be diplomatically astute.60  
The vulnerability of MILF resources to interdiction can be understood by the 
following observations. First, the geography of the southern Philippines. The Philippine 
archipelago presents many obstacles to the full exercise of sovereignty by the GRP, and 
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this provided a comparative advantage to the insurgent group.61 The MILF had established 
14 separate base commands throughout Mindanao and had access to their own strategically 
placed weapons caches.62 The difficulty of the terrain results in a relative parity of 
capabilities that cannot be overcome by the GRP without significant advantages in 
intelligence and precision targeting. It is arguable that the strength of the MILF geographic 
position placed the MILF in a stronger negotiating position due to the inability of the GRP 
to interdict the group’s resources. This may explain the relative staying power of the MILF 
and the MNLF, as these organizations occupy territory that is beyond the capacity of the 
GRP to control. Second, the localization of the movement and the refusal to be coopted by 
a broader transnational organization limits the movement of resources from abroad and 
forces self-reliance or reliance on the immediate resources available within the community. 
MILF leadership proved to be pragmatic and focused on political and economic reform at 
the expense of adopting a jihadist agenda that would have secured international support. 
Pragmatism may limit the potential for transnational support, but it strengthened the 
organization’s most vital support systems and shielded its resources from interdiction.   
Insurgencies such as the MILF are well suited to small footprint intervention. In the 
case of the MILF, modest training and enhanced capabilities, as well as diplomatic pressure 
on both sides of the conflict, led to significant results with relatively little blood or treasure 
expended. The legitimacy of the grievances, the credibility of the MILF in controlling the 
actions of its members, and the established history of diplomatic engagement are all 
promising signs that minimal diplomatic pressure and military assistance can deliver a 
modest course correction.  
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The Abu Sayyaf Group 
The ASG does not appear to have a path to a negotiated settlement, nor does the 
organization appear to seek one. Then, as now, the goal of the ASG is to establish an 
Islamic state in the Philippines, ruled by Sharia Law.63 The absence of a path to settlement 
is apparent for three reasons. First, the ASG is primarily a jihadist movement. Although 
the ASG has found common cause with the MILF and the MNLF for action in the past, it 
cannot be said that the ASG is in agreement with the MILF acceptance of a political 
resolution. The ASG simply does not have the combat power or political influence to direct 
the discourse, which is why the ASG has resorted to more dramatic acts of terrorism. 
Second, the adherents of the ASG are only loosely connected and the organization lacks 
influence over its own members. In Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group’s Strategic and 
Learning Capabilities, Luke Gerdes et. al conclude that the ASG membership is so 
convoluted and decentralized that members who gather together to conduct an operation 
frequently compete with one another rather than cooperate.64 There is a significant contrast 
between the broad grassroots support of the MILF and the ad hoc nature of the ASG. It is 
unlikely that the ASG, even if it articulated a vision that allowed for a political resolution, 
could ever compel the adherents of the group to comply. The ASG simply lacks the 
legitimacy of the MILF. Third, the ASG has a history of conducting terrorist attacks and 
provides no reason to assume that concessions will be made. The aspirations of the group 
are not self-determination or a response to injustice. The ASG aspires to impose a 
Wahabbist style theocracy and is not interested in concessions.65 
                                                 
63 Anisseh Van Engeland et al. From Terrorism to Politics. (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2008), 206. 
64 Luke M. Gerdes et al., “Assessing the Abu Sayyaf Group’s Strategic and Learning Capacities.” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 37 (2014): 270. 
65 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Meter Banditry to Genuine Terrorism.” Southeast 
Asian Affairs (2006): 251. 
 43 
The resources of the ASG have been vulnerable to interdiction. In 2004, the GRP 
formed an anti-terrorism task force and took several measures to disrupt the operations of 
the ASG. The task force established an anti-terrorism information system, improved 
intelligence sharing, pushed for the passage of an anti-terrorism law to improve prosecution 
of captured terrorists, passed an anti-money laundering act, worked with the US 
Department of the Treasury to seize the assets of key ASG leaders, and AFP raids seized 
significant amounts of ASG weapons and bomb-making materiel.66 These actions 
decimated the organization, reducing the active membership from 1269 known members 
to less than 250.67 This vulnerability existed despite the willingness of many local Muslims 
to provide shelter and resources to the ASG.  
The differences between these two insurgencies warrant different approaches. 
MILF leadership pursued a pragmatic approach to achieving a political resolution. The 
grievances of the MILF were rooted in historic disfranchisement and actions taken against 
an ethnic and religious minority. The MILF did not pursue a transnational or purely 
ideological agenda, although leadership did find alliances of convenience with the ASG 
and other terrorist groups at times. The MILF remained local, strengthened local networks 
and fostered solidarity. The geography of the Philippines allowed the MILF to operate 
outside the effective jurisdiction of Manila, and the insular tendencies of the MILF 
prevented the development of external dependencies that could have been exploited by the 
GRP as a weakness. In contrast, the ASG maintained an expansive jihadist agenda that was 
irreconcilable with any political concessions. The group relied on Jemaah Islamiyah and a 
foreign Wahabbist ideology that only loosely connected adherents. Furthermore, the purely 
ideological jihadist objectives immediately earned the ire of the United States and other 
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powers who facilitated the isolation and interdiction of assets. The MILF embraced an 
agenda that encouraged the United States to pressure the GRP to make concessions whereas 
the ASG embraced an agenda that encouraged its own destruction and political 
marginalization.  
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVENTION 
I analyze two questions regarding the intervention. First, I ask what role the 
intervening force assumed. In this case, the GRP did not permit the intervening military 
forces to engage in direct combat, but did authorize US forces to train, advise, and assist. 
The AFP remained in the lead and this empowered ownership of the counterinsurgency 
strategy. Second, I ask what role neighboring states played in the intervention. In the case 
of the Philippines, the support of regional partners enabled a more effective reconciliation 
process and assisted in the containment of irreconcilable insurgents. The neighbors 
legitimized the peace process and expanded the negotiation space. 
Intervention Overview 
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States increased efforts 
to combat Islamic terrorism around the globe. In the Philippines, the presence of the 
extremist elements previously discussed prompted intervention under the auspices of 
Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines. The initial intervention consisted of 
approximately 1,300 US troops stationed in various locations throughout the southern 
Philippine islands. The intervention force was organized as Joint Task Force (JTF) 510. 
The task force consisted of an air component stationed at Cebu to provide close air, medical 
evacuation, and logistical support, JTF staff to plan and coordinate operations, 
approximately 300 Navy Construction Battalion personnel to conduct civil-military 
operations, and 160 Army Special Forces to train, advise, and mentor the Armed Forces of 
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the Philippines (AFP).68 The operation was named Balikatan 02-1, and was centered along 
three primary lines of effort. First, American forces would build the capacity of the AFP 
through training and provision of key enabling assets. Second, US forces would enable 
Filipino led civil-military operations to enhance the legitimacy of the GRP. Finally, the US 
would provide support to Filipino led information operations to publicize the successes of 
the first two lines of operation. 69  
Role of US Forces 
The role of American troops in the Philippines was decidedly a non-combat role. 
While soldiers were authorized to carry weapons, and maintain an inherent right to self-
defense, the role was to advise, assist, and enable the GRP to conduct an indigenous 
counterinsurgency campaign. This is consistent with the doctrine of foreign internal 
defense and counterinsurgency theory that assumes indirect action to enable indigenous 
forces is more likely to lead to sustainable outcomes. In short, the smaller the footprint, the 
better.70 JTF 510 worked along the lines of effort described previously to improve the 
combat readiness of the AFP, conduct civil-military operations, and communicate success 
along these lines of effort to enhance the legitimacy of the GRP and degrade the 
effectiveness of the ASG. 
To build the capacity of the AFP, US troops first analyzed the state of readiness of 
both the AFP and the facilities occupied by the AFP. Due to a lack of resources and 
attention from the GRP, AFP soldiers in the southern Philippines were poorly equipped 
and lacked many of the basic skills necessary to wage a counterinsurgency campaign.71 
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Counterinsurgency warfare requires culturally astute soldiers who are simultaneously 
masters of small unit tactics. This form of warfare requires exceptional discipline and 
maturity due to the fact that minor oversights at the tactical level may have strategic 
consequences. US troops trained AFP units on collective small unit tactics, improved the 
defensibility of AFP outposts, provided advanced medical training, and accompanied AFP 
units on combat patrols (as advisors) to instill confidence in their partners.72 This training 
program increased the frequency and proficiency of AFP combat patrols and this 
established a GRP presence in previously denied areas. Consequently, the influence of the 
GRP was extended by the improved security situation and the increased visibility of the 
AFP. This was accomplished through the AFP without US troops assuming an 
administrative role. US troops focused on building partner capacity through training, 
observing, and enabling the success of the AFP.  
In addition to training, US forces enabled AFP led civil-military operations. The 
US military deployed troops specially trained to conduct civil affairs operations based on 
the needs of the civilian populace. These operations initially consisted of humanitarian 
assistance, but were eventually tailored to the specific needs of the community. The Navy 
deployed Naval Construction specialists to conduct larger projects, such as digging wells, 
building roads, bridges, and piers.73 These operations were conducted through the AFP 
with minimal US troop presence. These operations succeeded by allowing the AFP to 
interact with the population in insurgent controlled, or influenced, villages in a positive 
manner. This increased interaction countered the narrative of the ASG and consequently 
reduced ASG tacit support in the target villages and led to better relations between the 
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Muslim population and the AFP. These operations ultimately improved security by 
demonstrating that the GRP possessed the will and capacity to improve the lives of Muslim 
Filipinos.74 
Neighboring States 
The immediate neighbors of the host nation were not directly involved in the 
intervention. Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines is a distinctly bi-lateral operation 
that includes troops from the US and the Philippines. The support of neighboring states is 
essential to combat a transnational threat. Personnel, weapons, and other resources flow 
freely across porous borders to sustain the operations of terrorist organizations. In the case 
of the Philippines, the capacity of the GRP is sufficient to provide the troops and resources 
to conduct a counterinsurgency, and neighboring states were not called on to provide 
combat forces. However, Malaysia, Indonesia, and ASEAN all contributed in some way to 
the success of the GRP operation against the ASG. 
First, Malaysia played a crucial role in the negotiations with the MILF. As stated 
previously in this paper, the GRP appealed to Malaysia to act as a diplomatic intermediary 
to initiate peace talks. This led to six rounds of peace talks that ultimately led to a negotiated 
settlement with the MILF.75 While the intervention did not seek to resolve the conflict with 
the MILF, the previous negotiation of that conflict separated the ASG from a larger and 
more influential organization. Furthermore, the MILF could no longer provide active 
support for the ASG without compromising the hard won economic and political gains. 
Malaysian support for the MILF peace process indirectly assisted the GRP and the US in 
the fight against the ASG. 
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Second, Indonesia is home to Jemaah Islamiyah, a group that is supportive of the 
ASG and has been known to provide bomb-making material and expertise to Filipino ASG 
operatives.76 The Indonesian government has taken significant action to combat terrorism 
within its borders, passing an anti-terrorism law that was revised after the 2002 Bali 
bombings that led to the arrest of several members of Jemaah Islamiyah.77 The Indonesian 
government was criticized heavily for the capture and subsequent light sentencing of the 
spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir.78 However, US and Australian 
counterterrorism and law enforcement experts, working with the Indonesian government, 
established a counter terrorism task force that has had impressive success in dismantling 
Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia. This group seized bomb making material and weapons, 
uncovered the organizational structure chart, and ultimately captured more than 400 
terrorist suspects, to include JI leader Abu Dujana.79 
Finally, in addition to the actions of Malaysia and Indonesia, ASEAN has issued at 
least two declarations dealing directly with terrorism. At a meeting in 2002, the member 
states discussed measures to combat arms smuggling and drug trafficking, as well as 
extradition, law enforcement, and intelligence sharing to increase cooperation in response 
to terrorism in the region.80  
Taken together, these developments indicate a supportive regional alliance and 
neighbors with the capacity to prosecute competent national counterterror strategies. While 
there is no evidence of direct assistance with the intervention, the intelligence sharing and 
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common enemies in Jemaah Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf Group indicate an 
understanding of the shared challenges. 
CONCLUSION  
This case study analyzed the various factors of the regime, the insurgency, and the 
intervention to evaluate the suitability of small footprint strategy to combat the terrorist 
threat in the Philippines.  
The factors of the regime included measures of capacity and legitimacy. Capacity 
was measured by the ability of the regime to deliver basic services and provide security. 
Analysis demonstrates that as the regime gained greater capacity, as indicated by greater 
provision of goods and reduction in poverty, the counterinsurgency strategies implemented 
aligned closer with a classical counterinsurgency model. Legitimacy is derived from a 
restrained executive, political inclusion, and credible belief that the institutions of the 
regime are controlled by the government and are consistent with broadly shared norms of 
justice. The actions of Ferdinand Marcos sowed deep seeds of mistrust between the GRP 
and the insurgency, and the restoration of legitimacy occurred incrementally over several 
administrations and ultimately resulted in a peace agreement with the MILF. It must be 
noted that the GRP was not initially credible in the eyes of the MILF, as indicated by the 
repeatedly rebuffed overtures by the GRP that were later met with violence on both sides. 
Third-party interveners, in this case Malaysia and the United States, legitimated the peace 
process in a manner that the GRP was incapable of doing on its own. This case 
demonstrates the centrality of legitimacy to resolving an insurgency.  
The factors of the insurgency include the potential for a negotiated settlement and 
the likelihood of resource interdiction. In the case of the MILF, the separatist movement is 
an ethnically homogenous movement grounded in sincere grievances. The aims of the 
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MILF shifted as political opportunities presented themselves, revealing the underlying 
economic and political interests that drove a pragmatic policy on behalf of the MILF. The 
resources of the MILF were not vulnerable to interdiction. Rather, the geography of the 
southern Philippines allowed for the decentralization of personnel and equipment as well 
as presenting significant challenges to the GRP. In the case of the MILF, the invulnerability 
resulted in a near parity with the AFP that may have ultimately contributed to the 
opportunity for a negotiated settlement. Again, the ability of the MILF to make itself 
legitimate to its adherents ensured that the MILF could negotiate and enforce the results of 
those negotiations. Similar to the analysis of the regime, the shared norms of justice and 
adherents’ submission to formal authority enabled the MILF to consolidate power in a way 
that made it credible on the battlefield and in diplomacy. In contrast to the assessment of 
the MILF, the ASG appears to have limited potential for a negotiated settlement and high 
potential for interdiction of assets. The ASG remains a radical jihadist organization with a 
stated goal of establishing an Islamic state in the Philippines. The ASG exercises only 
limited control over its personnel and has continued to embrace terrorism. GRP and US 
actions to interdict ASG assets have successfully reduced the number of adherents from 
nearly 1,269 to roughly 250. 
Analysis of the intervention reveals that intervening forces operated strictly in an 
observer/trainer mode. The GRP imposed strict rules of engagement that ensured the 
prominence of the AFP and this was supported by US forces in adherence to the doctrine 
of foreign internal defense. US forces provided training and mentorship, assisted the AFP 
in organizing civil-military operations to build relationships with civilians affected by the 
insurgents’ activities, and engaged in information operations to strengthen the support from 
locals. This approach capitalized on the regime’s ongoing peace process and focused on 
increasing the capacity of the GRP and the AFP. This increased the range of options 
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available for prosecuting a counterinsurgency strategy and made the government forces 
more effective and transparent. Improved capabilities and the carefully restrained nature of 
the US involvement ensured that increased legitimacy was not undermined. The 
neighboring states supported the operations indirectly. Malaysia acted as an intermediary 
to help the GRP overcome barriers to the peace process by providing a venue perceived as 
legitimate by the MILF and the GRP. This was necessary due to a history of broken 
promises and a lack of shared expectations of GRP behavior. Indonesia also contributed to 
the containment of transnational terrorist elements in Southeast Asia. Indonesia passed 
sweeping anti-terrorism laws to crack down on Jemaah Islamiyah, a sponsor of ASG 
activities in the Philippines. ASEAN also provided a venue for regional cooperation to 
fight terrorism.  
This operation was well suited for a small footprint approach. The GRP consistently 
advanced to become a more capable and legitimate government. The MILF proved to be a 
pragmatic opposition that was more concerned with addressing grievances than exacting 
revenge. The ASG is persistent in its jihadist agenda but highly vulnerable to resource 
interdiction. Finally, the intervention avoided mission creep and allowed the institutions of 
the GRP and the AFP to conduct counterinsurgency with American advice and provision 
of assets. This last point is critical to solidifying the increased perceptions of legitimacy 
and strengthening shared notions of justice. 
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Chapter 4:  Operation Serval – Mali Case Study 
The French intervention in Mali provides another model for small footprint 
operations. While the methods employed are starkly contrasted against the American led 
intervention in the Philippines, the centrality of legitimacy to secure a negotiated resolution 
is equally apparent.  
In January of 2013, Francois Hollande described the French strategic objectives in 
Mali as an effort to, “stop terrorist aggression, secure a country in which there are many 
thousand French people, and permit Mali to recover its territorial integrity.” To achieve 
this, the French emphasized bold maneuver and engaged in creative diplomacy to build 
consensus among allies and secure support throughout the region. French operations 
relentlessly targeted insurgents, incorporated regional troops to provide security, and 
conducted civil-military operations to build support for the Malian regime. The French 
model required a significant force commitment to establish security and roll back the gains 
of the insurgency, but has since decreased its commitment significantly.   
The French intervention is significant for four major reasons. First, the Malian 
regime had endured an ill-timed coup perpetrated by a Malian army officer as well as a 
decisive military defeat at the hands of the Mouvement National Pour la Liberation de 
l’Azawad (MNLA). The regime, although still in power at the time of French intervention, 
had lost all credibility and was viewed by many as illegitimate. Second, the French military 
participated directly in ground combat. This contradicts many expectations of small 
footprint operations as focused on conducting operations by, with, and through the host 
nation. In the case of Mali, the utter lack of capacity and legitimacy required intervention 
to re-establish both. French operations consisted of conventional movements of 
mechanized columns as well as attack aviation, airborne operations, and precision strikes 
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by special operations forces. Third, the enemy forces were composed of a mix of 
transnational organizations and local ethnic separatists. The initial grievances were 
expressed by ethnic Tuaregs returning from Libya, but this movement was soon seized 
upon by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM significantly influenced the 
ambitions and actions of the insurgency. The disparity among these various insurgent 
groups vying for control exposed rifts that were exploited through diplomatic efforts of 
regional partners. The credibility and perceived legitimacy of Algeria allowed for 
negotiations that effectively parsed these interests. Finally, French regional engagement 
and diplomacy provides an opportunity to analyze the impact of multi-lateral institutions 
and agreements. The French received unanimous support from the UN, negotiated troop 
commitments from Mali’s neighbors, and coordinated with the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) to build a sustainable coalition.  
Although this operation is still ongoing, there are several observations that must be 
noted before the French model can be applied elsewhere. The French model was highly 
contingent on a history of regional engagement. The French have maintained an 
archipelago of legacy bases throughout the former French colonies that act as lily pads for 
staging operations. This factor, combined with the diplomatic relationships the French have 
fostered in the region, allowed the French to build combat power rapidly and act decisively. 
The early success of this operation should not be assumed to be replicable elsewhere, but 
should be understood as a result of circumstances unique to French intervention in Africa. 
Most significantly, the French actions in Mali violate many assumptions made by 
advocates who disavow direct action as a form of small footprint operations. For this 
reason, the intervention warrants a thorough investigation. 
 54 
BACKGROUND 
The root cause of the conflict in Mali is the ethnic tension between the Tuaregs of 
northern Mali and the southern Malian government in Bamako. The Tuareg, similar to the 
Kurds in Iraq, are a nation without a state. When the colonial powers allowed their African 
colonies to declare independence, the borders drawn resulted in the Tuareg people being 
split between Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad.81 Since independence, 
the Tuareg people have fought the government of Mali for greater autonomy and to bring 
development and security to their ancestral homeland referred to as Azawad. The Tuareg 
rebellion in the 1990s resulted in concessions from the Malian government that granted 
greater autonomy. This agreement is known as the National Pact.82 However, political 
infighting and renewed tribal tension caused the Tuareg community to fracture. This 
discord was ultimately resolved by leaders from Mali’s various ethnic groups through an 
agreement known as the Bourem Pact, which regulated access to resources and provided 
an informal political process to address grievances.83 As the Malian government worked to 
enhance democratization and to decentralize state processes, the Tuareg people obtained a 
greater degree of autonomy and many leaders were coopted into the Malian government. 
Despite this positive development, low level raiding and infighting continued to be 
common among the Tuareg. The weakness of the Malian regime left the Tuareg vulnerable 
to infiltration, and AQIM seized the opportunity to provide protection and basic services 
that the government was incapable of providing. This led to connecting the Tuareg fight 
for independence to a broader jihadist movement. The events of the Arab Spring brought 
the delicate regional anti-terrorism efforts to the breaking point, and the fall of Qaddafi led 
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to an influx of well-armed Tuareg fighters into the ungoverned spaces of northern Mali.84 
The combination of renewed separatist Tuareg conflict and global jihadism soon 
overwhelmed the weak Malian regime. 
Tuareg Rebellion: 1990-1991 
In the 1980s, Tuareg leaders prepared for a rebellion against the Malian 
government. They established weapons and ammunition caches across northern Mali. 
Malian authorities learned of the preparations, and dispatched the secret service to 
confiscate the weapons and apprehend the offending Tuareg fighters. In June 1990, a 
lightly armed group of Tuareg attacked the town of Menaka to free the prisoners, retrieve 
the confiscated weapons, and pillage trucks and supplies from the Malian military. The 
operation was a staggering success, and the rebels freed their imprisoned comrades, 
retrieved the previously seized weapons, and stole a fleet of four-wheel drive trucks and 
machine guns from the Malian military. The rebels later used the captured vehicles to their 
advantage by mounting machine guns and operating as a light cavalry organization, able 
to move quickly across the desert with significant firepower and mass their forces rapidly 
on any objective. This unit consisted of around 200 battle hardened Tuaregs, and roughly 
4,000 Malian soldiers were deployed to combat the rebels.85  
The Malian military, frustrated with its inability to defeat the Tuareg rebels, took 
vengeance on Tuareg civilians. These actions strengthened the resolve of the Tuareg and 
increased the active and tacit support that was provided to the rebels. The rebel movement 
came to be known as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA).86 The 
effective campaign against the Malian army led to a cease fire agreement, brokered by the 
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Algerians with President Traore, that granted autonomy to the Tuareg movement.87 The 
history of Algerian intercession to mediate disputes between the Tuareg and the 
government in Bamako is similar to Malaysia mediating disputes between the GRP and the 
MILF. In these negotiations, we see the significance of Algeria in resolving disputes among 
the Tuareg and building the trust that will be necessary for resolving future disputes. 
Algeria is viewed as legitimate by both parties.  
Shortly after granting Tuareg autonomy, President Traore was deposed and a new 
democratic regime was installed under the leadership of Alpha Oumar Konare. Konare’s 
regime brokered another agreement in April 1992 with the French and Mauritanians 
mediating. This new peace agreement was known as the National Pact, and it called for the 
reintegration of rebel forces into the Malian army as well as programs for economic 
development in the heavily Tuareg north.88 Both tasks proved highly problematic. Plans 
for economic development were stillborn, and reintegration largely resulted in Tuareg 
fighters deserting their Malian units and returning home. The inability of the government 
to deliver on the terms of the negotiated settlements undermined the legitimacy of the 
regime in the eyes of the Tuareg, and sowed the seeds for future conflict. 
Tuareg Infighting: 1991-1996 
After the victory over the Malian army in 1991, the complicated tribal and familial 
conflicts within the Tuareg coalition began to surface. The competing visions for the future 
of the Tuareg autonomous region resulted in the creation of several new organizations. 
These factions included the Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA) and the 
Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (ARLA). In addition to these Tuareg groups, 
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Malian Arab tribes founded the Arab-Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA).89 This 
fragmentation reduced the strength of the MPLA which was then reorganized as the 
Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA). In the infighting, the MPA fought against the 
ARLA and the FPLA. The MPA later allied itself with the Malian army to defeat the ARLA 
and establish the MPA as the primary Tuareg power.90 The regional instability also led to 
an increase in criminal activity, with many unemployed Tuaregs robbing commercial 
vehicles and travelers, as well as raiding villages near the Niger river, the unofficial border 
with southern Mali. These attacks on southern Malian villages prompted retaliation from 
the Songhay (a southern Malian ethnic group) who formed the Ganda Koy movement to 
defend their lands. This movement sought revenge against ethnic Tuaregs by attacking 
their villages and this resulted in the displacement of nearly 100,000 ethnic Tuaregs.91 The 
Tuareg and Arab tribes of Azawad initiated reconciliation among the various fragmented 
groups in what came to be known as the Bourem Pact.92 This movement was initiated by 
tribal elders and did not seek the counsel or approval of the various rebel factions or any 
state. Nonetheless, the Bourem Pact regulated access to resources, established “rencontres 
intracommunataires” to facilitate dialogue among various ethnic groups, and facilitated a 
return to peace. On 25 March 1996, a ceremony was held in Timbuktu that led to nearly a 
decade of peace.93 
“Demokalashi” 1996-2006 
The 1992 National Pact with the Malian government and the Bourem Pact ushered 
in a new period of Tuareg politics. Under the leadership of president Konare, the Bamako 
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government pursued policies of democratization and decentralization that allocated power 
over health, education, and infrastructure to local communes. As a result of decentralization 
policies, 682 communes established elected councils and mayors.94 These programs 
provided much more opportunity for the Tuareg tribes to participate in the political process 
and order their affairs according to their traditions. This period was characterized by 
cooptation of Tuareg elites into the Malian government as well as continued political 
infighting that would result in political violence among the various Tuareg factions. 
Violence among the Tuareg was normally a result of conflicts over pastures, access to 
water, and occasional raiding.95 Simultaneous to these political developments, the 
geostrategic value of the region changed. Western oil companies in search of hydrocarbons 
as well as increased commerce revived trans-Saharan trade routes and spawned 
development.96 In addition to increased economic activity and development, the War on 
Terror brought new attention to the Sahel, initiating the American led Pan-Sahel Initiative 
establishing small tactical infrastructure at Tamanrasset (Algeria), Tessalit (Mali), and 
Assamaka (Niger).97 
Internationalization of the Tuareg Conflict (Confronting AQIM in the Sahel) 
The Groupe Salafiste de Predication et du Djihad (GSPC) was an Algerian Islamist 
nationalist movement later incorporated into Al Qaeda’s global jihadist ideology. The 
GSPC sought to overthrow the Algerian regime and instite sharia law in Algeria.98 In 2007, 
the GSPC was contacted by Yemeni and Saudi emissaries sent by Osama Bin Laden. The 
                                                 
94 Jennifer C. Seely, “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali” 
Journal of Modern African Studies 39, 3 (2001): 499-501. 
95 Baz Lecocq and Georg Klute, “Tuareg Separatism in Mali” International Journal 68, 3 (2013): 428. 
96 Jedrzej George Frynas and Manuel Paulo, “A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and 
Business Perspectives” African Affairs 106, 423 (2007): 237.  
97 Stephen Ellis, “The Pan-Sahel Initiative” African Affairs 103, 412 (2004): 462. 
98 Djallil Lounas, “Confronting AQIM in the Sahel: Algeria and the Malian Crisis,” Journal of North 
African Studies 19, 5 (2014): 812. 
 59 
emissaries proposed that the GSPC lead a regional jihadist organization throughout the 
Sahel. Bin Laden’s vision was to unite Moroccan, Libyan, Mauritanian, Malian, and 
Algerian Islamist organizations under one banner to fight for the cause of global jihad. In 
2007, Al Zawahiri formally announced the acceptance of the GSPC under the assumption 
that the organization would unite these various factions in North Africa. The new 
organization took up the banner of Al Qaeda and renamed itself Al Qaeda in the land of 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).99 AQIM had an estimated strength of around 1,500 fighters, 
and these forces were divided into two primary regions: Kabylia in Algeria and Azawad in 
northern Mali.100  
AQIM forces in Kabylia numbered between 600 and 900 fighters. These fighters 
were focused on recruiting, kidnapping operations, and fighting the Algerian regime. 
Kabylia is also home to several other armed groups, many of which are opposed to radical 
Islamic ideology and would prefer to see AQIM eradicated. This has led to a general 
rejection from the people and has left AQIM largely isolated and surrounded. The terrain 
is mountainous and heavily wooded, which provides adequate cover and concealment from 
Algerian military forces. Nonetheless, the persistent fighting and restricted mobility due to 
the inhospitable local population has allowed the Algerian regime to effectively contain 
the Kabylia faction of AQIM.101 
AQIM forces in the Sahel began with approximately 40 men led by Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar. This element was originally intended to provide a rear area threat to the 
Algerian regime, but later morphed into a broader movement consisting of around 500 
fighters. The Salafist Algerians of AQIM found themselves surrounded by Tuaregs who 
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practiced Sufi Islam, which the Salafists considered to be an apostate form of Islam. 
Despite the religious differences, the endemic poverty and weakness of the Malian military 
allowed AQIM to build rapport among the Tuaregs by providing basic services, food, and 
protection.102 The lawless environment also allowed AQIM to raise additional funds 
through drug trafficking, smuggling, and kidnap for ransom operations which funded social 
welfare programs as well as weapons and ammunition for the Kabyle faction.103  
AQIM’s strategy in the Sahel allowed the movement to incorporate other regional 
actors. The Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) emerged as a Tuareg 
dominated faction that shared the global jihadist agenda with AQIM. To appeal to the 
Tuareg, AQIM appointed Abdel Krim Al Targui, the cousin of Iyad Ag Ghali, a prominent 
Tuareg leader, to lead the MUJAO. In addition to MUJAO, Iyad Ag Ghali formed the 
Ansar Al-Din movement as an ethnic Tuareg movement that was also aligned with AQIM 
and MUJAO. Ghali is central to the jihadist movement in Mali, as he was appointed by 
President Amadou Toumani Toure as the Malian Consul to Saudi Arabia, where he was 
radicalized and converted to Salafism.104 Ghali’s movement, Ansar al-Din, would later 
provide a Salafist alternative to the more secular Tuareg dominated MNLA.  
Algeria perceived the threat of AQIM as an existential threat to Algerian 
sovereignty. Consequently, the Algerian army pursued a strategy of containment of the 
Kabyle faction and a cooperative regional approach to interdict resources and 
communication traveling north from the Sahel. The Algerian Army successfully interdicted 
AQIM personnel and weapons attempting to enter Algeria from ungoverned spaces in Mali. 
Between 2007 and 2010 more than 1,200 AQIM jihadis were arrested and 250 killed 
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attempting to cross north into Algeria.105 Tunisia and Libya were close partners with 
Algeria in a policy designed to contain AQIM in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel and 
deny access to their respective countries. These safe havens remained due to Algeria's 
constitutional limitations on the exercise of military power that prohibited the Algerian 
army from operating in a foreign country without an existing treaty authorizing an 
intervention.106 Despite the constitutional limitations, the Algerians developed intelligence 
sharing and cooperative anti-terrorism measures that were effective. For example, these 
efforts resulted in the capture of Abderrazak Al-Para, the former second in command of 
the GSPC, in Libya at the hands of Chadian forces. He was subsequently extradited to 
Algeria.107 Mauritania was also engaged in anti-terrorism activities, supported heavily by 
the French. Mali was much less successful. Despite US training, the Malian forces were no 
match for AQIM and the organization continued to operate with near impunity in the 
northern areas of Mali.108 There is suspicion that the Malian president had a secret 
agreement with AQIM that resolved to allow them to operate in the north so long as there 
was no interference in the south. This is consistent with accounts that the Malian president 
was not interested in the plight of northern Malians, particularly the Tuaregs.109 
Algerian efforts to contain AQIM required cooperation with Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya. The initial results were promising, as Al Qaeda was 
effectively contained in the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel. The Algerians were hesitant 
to share the role of regional power broker with the US or France. The Algerians were intent 
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on maintaining control and pursuing a regional diplomatic approach. They mistrusted the 
intentions of the French as the French engaged in diplomatic and security agreements with 
several other north African states. This equilibrium that was arduously obtained and 
delicately managed by Algeria, was upset dramatically by the events of the Arab Spring. 
The aftermath of the Arab Spring led to the utter collapse of the Algerian strategy of 
containment. Most significantly, the collapse of the Qaddafi regime benefited AQIM 
directly. The breakdown of containment caused by the overthrow in Libya led to the return 
of Tuareg fighters to Mali.110 
The Aftermath of Qaddafi’s Defeat, January 2012 – January 2013 
In January of 2012 nomadic Tuareg tribesmen returned to northern Mali after years 
of fighting for Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. These fighters returned with weapons and 
equipment pilfered from Qaddafi’s stores and they made quick work of the poorly trained 
and poorly equipped Malian forces. These fighters, approximately 1,000 in number, re-
ignited the rebellion of the 1960s and 1990s. The fighters formed the Mouvement National 
Pour la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA) and declared their purpose to liberate Azawad 
(Mali north of the Niger river).111 The Malian army, particularly junior officers, resented 
the poor performance of the government and blamed the president for the humiliating 
defeat.112 
On March 22, 2012 Captain Amadou Sanogo, a Malian army officer, led a coup to 
remove President Amadou Toumani Toure. Sanogo cited the lack of weapons and 
equipment for the Malian army and he believed that the President had fundamentally failed 
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to protect the territorial integrity of Mali.113 The coup came as a surprise because Mali was 
considered an African success story of developing democracy due to the pursuit of 
democratization and decentralization previously noted.114 The international community 
condemned the coup and Sanogo promised a return to civilian rule contingent upon 
elections. Toure, the president overthrown by Sanogo, was scheduled to leave office in one 
month and had agreed not to stand for another term.115 The coup was an ill-timed 
expression of discontent that resulted in weakening Mali further. The coup was a reaction 
to the failure of Toure, but the result of the coup was an emboldened rebellion that was 
now poised to make further territorial gains at the expense of the Malian government.116 
On April 6, 2012, the MNLA declared the liberation of the independent state of 
Azawad. The rebels seized Timbuktu, a city of great cultural and historic significance to 
Malians, immediately prior to the announcement of liberation. The MNLA took advantage 
of the opportunity presented by the coup in the south. The political infighting prevented 
the Malian government from negotiating a political resolution. French and US officials 
feared that the deteriorating situation in northern Mali would embolden AQIM to exploit 
the ungoverned space and expand operations throughout north Africa.117 The international 
community was also hesitant to involve itself with the military junta now in control of Mali, 
but there was still no recognition or legitimacy granted to the claims of an independent 
Azawad. These two conflicting concerns are expressed by the fact that ECOWAS imposed 
economic sanctions to express disapproval with the coup leaders, but simultaneously 
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contemplated plans to commit troops to assist Mali.118 The conditions were ripe for terrorist 
infiltration of the movement as much of the country was now ungovernable and 
involvement posed a great enough political risk to keep the international community at a 
distance. 
The fears of the international community were confirmed in June of 2012 as hard 
line Islamists flooded into Mali and imposed a harsh interpretation of Islamic Law.119 The 
rebel movement was now under the control of Ansar Din and Sharia law was imposed in 
all controlled territories. Music was forbidden, thieves suffered amputation, and Malians 
were subject to public floggings and executions.120 Islamists established morality police to 
enforce Sharia law and it was applied enthusiastically. Timbuktu’s cultural treasures were 
defaced, particularly a shrine to a 15th century saint. The human rights abuses were 
profound, with reports of repeated rape of Malian women and abuse of children.121 The 
conditions established by the Islamists drove many Malians from their homes in fear. 
Over 92,000 Malian refugees fled Islamic rule to refugee camps in nearby 
Mauritania.122 Refugees described the circumstances in Mali and confirmed the influx of 
terrorists from abroad, indicating the broad attraction of an ungovernable region to 
international terrorist organizations. Furthermore, this influx of foreign fighters under the 
banner of AQIM caused a conflict with the largely Tuareg MNLA, indicating a rift in the 
Islamist coalition.123 Those who remained in Mali were subject to the cruelties of foreign 
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hardline Islamists. With the marginalization of the MNLA there was a fracturing of the 
coalition that led some who remained behind in Mali to take up arms.124 
The international community had not yet determined a plan to assist Mali with 
military forces, though there was discussion of West African nations supplying 3,000 
troops to assist with security. This modest military assistance was not approved by the 
United Nations Security Council and there was no plan to fund it.125 Under these 
conditions, many Malians flocked to the militias. The army was still in disarray, but army 
leaders provided training to volunteers nonetheless. These individuals were poorly 
equipped; many were not supplied with weapons and there was no ammunition for 
training.126 Nonetheless, these volunteers lived with the reality that their relatives were 
suffering under the rule of Islamists in northern Mali and felt they had nowhere else to turn. 
Despite the willingness of the militiamen to fight, the army suffered from a crisis of 
confidence and the absence of any movement to assist from the international community.127 
The UN sent humanitarian aid for occupied areas, but without a military commitment from 
a capable partner, or a consensus for action from the international community, there was 
little cause for optimism.128 
The United Nations Security Council, with strong French encouragement, resolved 
to consider acting in Mali. On October 12, 2012, after months of hesitation and failing to 
commit, the UN Security Council asked for a detailed plan for intervention to be submitted 
within 45 days.129 The international community decided that the crisis caused by the large 
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influx of foreign fighters, and the humanitarian crisis causing more than 300,000 refugees, 
posed a significant threat to stability in north Africa.130 Furthermore, AQIM and its 
affiliates established training camps to expand their ranks and improve their combat 
readiness. There were even reports of young children engaging in military training.131 The 
French were the most vocal proponents of military action to restore order to northern Mali. 
Many French citizens live abroad in North Africa, and there was a palpable fear of an 
escalation of kidnappings and other terrorist attacks as the Jihadists grew in strength and 
influence.132 This initial discussion proposed Algerian, Chadian, or Mauritanian troops as 
the ground forces, with European and American forces providing airlift, intelligence 
support, or other enablers.133 The international mood began to shift in favor of intervention, 
and the Islamists were compelled to respond. 
As western nations moved towards acceptance of armed intervention, AQIM and 
its affiliates in northern Mali responded with a sharp increase in kidnappings.134 
Kidnapping was a lucrative industry for Jihadists. AQIM is reported to have collected over 
$90 million in ransom from western powers.135 The ransoms collected were used to arm 
and equip the Jihadists and this in turn fueled more kidnappings. These terrorist groups 
also believed that holding Europeans captive was insurance against intervention, claiming 
that if airstrikes began they would “have their throats cut like chickens, one after the 
other.”136 This created a policy conundrum for western governments. The United States is 
unique in that it does not negotiate or pay ransom. America’s European allies on the other 
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hand were largely responsible for funding the kidnapping operations that were so 
effectively used as political leverage against them. As this situation escalated, the 
international community was compelled to respond more forcefully. 
On December 20, 2012, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sending 
thousands of troops to Mali.137 These troops were to be sourced by Mali’s African 
neighbors, mainly Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. However, the ground troops were 
not to be committed until Mali made considerable progress with its own military.138 It was 
projected that these forces would not commence operations against the Islamists in 
northern Mali until September or October of 2013.139 This would have left the country 
languishing under Islamic rule for the better part of a year. The international community 
was hesitant to pour resources and troops into Mali while the political instability and 
infighting continued. The international community also insisted that Mali provide a 
framework for a return to elected civilian rule.140 The United Nations Security Council 
suggested that it was a primary goal to find a political resolution that did not involve 
military action.141 A lack of confidence in the Malian army on behalf of the French and 
Americans indicated that there were significant doubts about the Malians’ ability to 
perform adequately in a long fight against the Islamist forces in the north.  
The military situation remained relatively static until January 10, 2013 when 
Islamist forces attacked south to seize the village of Konna from Malian government 
forces.142 The Malian army was thoroughly defeated and fled Konna in disarray. Konna 
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had strategic value to the Malians and the loss of Konna now left a critical airfield in Sevare 
vulnerable to attack.143 The international community watched in shock as the Malian army 
crumbled once again. There was hope that the army would have improved following its 
abysmal performance earlier in the year. In fact, the international community, before the 
fall of Konna, still believed that a resolution involving Malian forces re-taking northern 
Mali was preferable.144 Hope of an improved situation in Mali collapsed as Konna fell, 
prompting an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council and a letter from Mali’s 
interim president Dioncounda to French Ambassador to the UN Gerard Araud requesting 
assistance.145 It was abundantly clear that Mali could no longer contain, or even limit, the 
actions of the Islamist forces in the north. Islamist forces were now within striking distance 
of Mali’s major population center, Bamako, and the window of opportunity for action was 
beginning to close.146 
On January 11th, President of France, Francois Hollande, announced three distinct 
objectives of the intervention, to “stop the terrorist aggression, secure a country in which 
there are many thousand French people, and permit Mali to recover its territorial 
integrity.”147 The strategy initially called for simply blocking the movements of insurgents 
south of the Niger river and then waiting for the construction of an international coalition 
before commencing offensive operations to roll back the previous gains of the Islamists. 
The French military received intelligence regarding the disposition and expectations of the 
insurgent forces. The terrorist elements did not expect French forces to pursue them, and 
these enemy forces may have resolved to simply offer passive resistance to deny a superior 
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force an opportunity for a decisive engagement. Insurgent forces could simply abandon the 
gains made and scatter into the mountains or into the villages, as the FLN did in Algeria 
following the Battle of Algiers.  
Observing that the opportunity for a decisive confrontation was dissipating, the 
French abandoned their previous strategy and built a revised strategy on two basic 
premises. First, that French forces would have to move fast and outpace the insurgents. 
Francois Hollande stated this clearly in his guidance, saying “destroy those in front of you 
and go fast.”148 Second, ground operations are central. This second point is articulated well 
by a prominent French military theorist, Vincent Desportes:  
Contact on the ground, over the longer term, affirms itself as an essential 
argument, and combat, always combined arms at the lowest level, at short 
distances and even close quarters, comes back in force. On the contrary, the 
pertinence of standoff – combat at safe distance – declines. The dream of “fire 
and forget” dissolves before the absolute necessity of occupying newly secured 
space, meter by meter.149 
These two characteristics would come to define Operation Serval. Combining speed with 
ground operations allowed the French to dictate operational tempo by maintaining constant 
pressure on the insurgent forces. 
ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT 
The understanding that small footprint operations are more likely to succeed if the 
regime is reasonably capable and perceived as legitimate must be elaborated for the Malian 
context. Whereas the Filipino government was reasonably capable and required only an 
augmentation of capabilities and diplomatic intervention to pursue a peace process, the 
Malian case is one of abject failure of both capacity and legitimacy. I generally presume 
that significant state failure, such as the case in Mali, is ill suited to a small footprint 
                                                 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
 70 
intervention. Mali, as a tactical success story, seems to contradict this understanding. 
Despite a lack of both capacity and legitimacy, French forces intervened with a small 
footprint strategy and achieved a stunning tactical success. I now turn to an evaluation of 
regime capacity and legitimacy. 
Capacity 
Per capita electric power consumption in Mali is reported as 34.6 kilowatt hours 
per person.150 This data was not available through the World Bank’s data, which reflects 
the extraordinarily low consumption. This figure is a 2010 estimate and reflects the 
inability of the government to provide this service at the time the insurgency took hold. 
The percentage of the population with access to improved water and sanitation is extremely 
low. In 2012, only 23.3% of Malians had access to improved sanitation facilities while only 
70.9% had access to clean water.151  Furthermore, during the period in question the national 
economy contracted by 3.3% and Mali was ranked 182 of 187 countries on the World 
Development Index.152 These conditions combine to create a sense of constant chaos and 
famine in Mali. Poverty is endemic, with 47% of Malians living below the global poverty 
line, and thousands suffering from infectious diseases due to poor sanitation. Taken 
together, these indicators reveal a government that was incapable of providing basic 
services or improving the lives of citizens. Despite the constitutional reforms of 1992 and 
the efforts of democratization and decentralization, the Malian government was unable to 
make itself credible. In this sense, legitimacy was directly tied to state capacity. The 
government, on paper at least, sought to grant a significant degree of autonomy but lacked 
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the capacity to enforce the rule of law or exert effective leadership.153 This lack of capacity, 
especially in northern Mali, provided an opportunity for AQIM to build support for its 
jihadist agenda by providing some basic elements of governance at very low cost. 
The military also suffered from a lack of capacity. As noted previously, the military 
had proven ineffective at combating lightly armed rebels. The entire military apparatus, to 
include police and reserve forces, numbered 10,720 personnel.154 The inability of the army 
to provide security is frequently reported, and the widespread insecurity led many to join 
militias, gangs, criminal organizations, or the jihadists to achieve a greater sense of 
security. Furthermore, the poor reputation of the Malian defense forces has led many to 
suspect that the humanitarian failures and barbarity of the Malian army is equivalent to the 
crimes committed by the Islamist factions.155 Not only do the Malian people have no faith 
in the ability of the Malian army to protect them from external threats, they actively fear 
the intentions of their defense forces. Legitimacy requires that the use of force be subject 
to cultural norms of authority. In this context, where force is exerted by factions warring 
against one another, the government’s illegitimacy is nakedly apparent. 
The lack of Malian state and military capacity may have been further undermined 
by international aid. Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, argue that a surge in 
international aid has become a contested resource among the various Tuareg groups.156 It 
is possible that the lack of Malian capacity illustrated through a decentralized government 
lacking authority and accountability fostered an environment of patronage politics. It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that in this type of environment, international aid organizations 
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unintentionally removed the government as an honest broker and service provider by 
injecting additional resources to be distributed through patronage.  
Legitimacy 
The most obvious condemnation of the legitimacy of the Malian government is that 
the government experienced a coup d’etat during a time of existential crisis. The ousted 
president was not up for re-election, and his term was set to expire in four weeks. This fact 
makes the coup seem nonsensical. Yet two facts illuminate the logic behind the coup. First, 
the president, Amadou Toumani Toure, ordered a constitutional referendum within weeks 
of the end of his term. The timing of this action led many to believe that he was intent on 
amending the constitution to maintain power.157 While Mali did have a reputation for stable 
democracy, it should be remembered that democratic institutions were barely 20 years old 
at the time and the military coup that ushered in the democratic reforms in 1991 was still 
living memory for many Malians. Second, despite the failures of the Malian army, the army 
still enjoyed higher trust among the people than the president. Susanna Wing reports that 
42% of Malians trust the National Assembly, 43% trust the President, and 67% trust the 
military.158 The short lived democratic tradition, threat of constitutional referendum 
resulting in a seizure of power, acceptance of military coups as legitimate options for 
regime change, and the higher trust in the army than the president are all aspects of the 
domestic political situation that better inform our judgment. It bodes poorly for Mali that 
the military was viewed as more legitimate than the government, as the military crumbled 
in the face of a growing insurgency. 
To examine legitimacy further, I turn to the question of political inclusion. The 
1992 National Pact provided an opportunity for ethnic Tuaregs to participate in the political 
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system. The government of Mali made a concerted effort to co-opt Tuareg leaders and to 
allow for greater autonomy. Despite these efforts, evidence of inclusion is scant. First, 
many Tuaregs express that the vision of nationhood espoused by the government in 
Bamako deliberately excludes the narrative of their people. This is significant because 
political inclusion requires political reality as a prerequisite.159 Inclusion requires a national 
identity of some sort, and the deliberate attempt to exclude the Tuareg undermined all 
future concessions or negotiations for greater autonomy.160 Second, the attempts at greater 
inclusion involved an expansion of government roles. The Malian government sought more 
government rather than better government.161 This led to an overly collaborative form of 
governance that effectively weakened the power of government officials. In the north 
where the government had very little capacity, this resulted in a government that lacked 
credibility. This was further exacerbated by an immature democratic system wherein many 
of the actors still perceived politics as a zero-sum game and failed to grasp the value of 
democratic competition. Instead, Malian elites favored consensus politics and patronage.162 
Finally, political inclusion can be measured by voting data. In the two most populous 
regions of northern Mali, Gao and Kidal, voter turnout in the presidential elections in 2005 
was 16.29% and 16.53% respectively. This contrasts with the most populous southern 
Malian regions of Kayes, Koulikoro, and Mopti that had turnout of 45.55%, 56.4%, and 
41.5% respectively.163 This disparity in the exercise of the right to vote between the north 
and south demonstrates a lack of interest on the part of the northern Malians, which is likely 
a result of political exclusion. Furthermore, the necessity of shared notions of justice is not 
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achieved in a system where various ethnic groups ascribe to their own understanding of 
justice and governance. 
Executive authority of the president was perceptibly weak. The presidency under 
ATT was suspected of corruption and even complicity in the kidnapping and violence of 
AQIM. There is evidence of complicity between government officials and terrorist 
organizations operating throughout the north. The drug trade and other illicit activities have 
strengthened this partnership and democracy has been the primary casualty. This invited 
AQIM and other groups to operate in the north and allowed them to gain legitimacy as the 
people perceived the government as weak and ineffective.164 These perceptions of 
corruption and complicity had disastrous effects on the military, as three out of four Malian 
military units operating in the north defected when the insurgency began. Defection of 
Malian military personnel swelled the ranks of the MNLA by 1,600 armed soldiers.165 
Considering the relative weakness of the military, this is not a negligible defection and this 
further indicates that those responsible for employing the instruments of state power had 
different notions of the just application of force. The unwillingness to fight for the 
government indicates that even the military did not share the government’s formal 
articulation of norms of justice. In this case, notions of justice were certainly not broadly 
shared, but were as fractious as the Malian ethnic identity. 
Mali lacked both capacity and legitimacy. The government was unable to provide 
basic services, and the military was incapable of providing security in the north. What little 
capacity the state possessed was frittered away through consensus politics and potentially 
undermined by international aid that injected more resources into a system of patronage 
with ineffective oversight. The state lacked legitimacy and there is demonstrable exclusion 
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of northern Malians. The weakness of the president and the Malian institutions proved that 
the government could not be trusted to enforce the rule of law. This is apparent by the 
partnership between the government and the Islamist forces in the north. The Malian 
government pursued the common solution to ethnic conflicts in Africa, decentralization 
and delegation of governmental authority to appease separatists. This opened the door for 
transnational organizations to take advantage of an ungovernable space. The lack of 
capacity precluded any real sharing of power through this approach and the resulting 
elections became nothing more than an ethnic census.166 Mali, despite the laudable 
democratic achievements, was nothing more than a thin veneer of democracy at the time 
of the French intervention. 
ANALYSIS OF THE INSURGENCY 
The French intervention in Mali is concerned with two types of insurgencies: 
transnational jihadists and local separatist insurgent groups. At times these groups coalesce 
due to common interests, but these groups maintain different aspirations and the coalitions 
formed around common grievances can be fractured through strategic diplomatic 
engagement that appeals to the core interests of the reconcilable groups and isolates the 
irreconcilables. AQIM, Ansar al-Din, and MUJAO viewed an independent Azawad as 
central to a regional Islamist movement and espoused an ideological jihadist agenda that 
appealed to many Muslims beyond nationality and political boundaries. On the other hand, 
the MNLA remained primarily concerned with Tuareg independence and proved more 
pragmatic through cooperation with the French forces. 
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Tuareg Separatist Insurgent Groups 
The Tuareg path to a negotiated settlement is evident for two reasons. First, the 
Tuareg separatist groups have a history of using both diplomacy and violence to advance 
political goals. The Tuareg rebelled in 1991 to seek greater representation and political 
inclusion and used violence to bring the regime in Bamako to the table. The military 
prowess of a small group of lightly armed Tuareg handled the Malian army rather roughly, 
and forced a negotiated settlement in the National Pact of 1992. Failure of the Bamako 
regime to live up to the terms resulted in continued violence until a more lasting peace was 
brokered in 2006. In both circumstances the Tuareg used calculated violence to provoke a 
political settlement. The actions of the Tuareg in rebellion are rooted in legitimate concerns 
that can be resolved through negotiation. Second, the MNLA was rejected by the extremists 
and collaborated extensively with the French. The MNLA led a loose coalition that 
included AQIM, Ansar al-Din and MUJAO to rapid victories in Timbuktu, Gao, and 
Kidal.167 The Malian army was defeated, and the more extreme groups allied with AQIM 
no longer tolerated the secular nature of the MNLA. The MNLA stood by as sharia law 
was imposed and control of the operation was ceded to AQIM. Many within the MNLA 
resented the jihadists marginalization of their movement, and when the French intervened, 
the MNLA were willing to offer tacit support.168 This fractured the coalition, isolated the 
more extreme elements, and presented an opportunity for the intervention force to ally itself 
with the MNLA to compete with AQIM for Tuareg support. 
The resources of separatist groups are not easily interdicted. Familial and tribal ties 
provide tacit and active support for separatist activities. Financial support, equipment, and 
basic provision can be more easily acquired when the insurgency is supported by the 
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people. The resources of a decentralized insurgency are much more difficult to interdict 
because there is very little movement or consolidation. When weapons or ammunition are 
consolidated, the tacit support of the people makes it much more difficult for the 
government to locate the caches. Furthermore, the current livelihood patterns may often 
continue to make provision for fighters. Transnational groups will turn to smuggling and 
kidnapping, as was the case with AQIM, and these activities draw the attention of foreign 
governments who will pressure the indigenous government to crack down on such 
behavior. An insurgency that enjoys tacit support inside its ancestral homeland will reveal 
no such pattern for exploitation. 
Transnational Insurgent Groups 
AQIM in the Sahel was the main beneficiary of Qaddafi’s collapse. AQIM 
consolidated the efforts of Ansar al Din, MUJAO, and AQIM to overwhelm the semi-
secular Tuareg nationalist MNLA and seize control of the Azawad movement. At this 
point, the moderates ceased to be in control, and the possibility for a negotiated settlement 
was reduced significantly.169 There was no evident path to a negotiated settlement with 
AQIM at the time and the same remains true today. I make two points regarding the 
irreconcilability of AQIM. First, AQIM is part of a global jihadist movement. AQIM grew 
out of an Algerian separatist organization known as the GSPC. Al Qaeda engaged in global 
jihad against the west, primarily focused on the United States after the September 11, 2001 
attacks. Bin Laden sought to expand the Al Qaeda franchise and surveyed North Africa for 
a regional organization that could be internationalized. In 2006, Ayman al Zawahiri 
announced a formal alliance between the GSPC and Al Qaeda saying, “This blessed union 
will be a bone in the throat of the American and French crusaders . . . and will bring fear 
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to the hearts of the miscreant sons of France.”170 The goals and aspirations of AQIM go far 
beyond the deserts of North Africa and the organization is not content to settle for political 
concessions.  
AQIM’s resources are vulnerable to interdiction for the following reasons. First, 
AQIM spent a decade establishing training camps in Mali that were destroyed within 4 
weeks of French military operations. The French prevented training, destroyed over 2,000 
tons of weapons, and targeted key personnel, significantly disrupting their financial 
operations.171 Second, the geography of northern Mali is optimal for unmanned drones and 
attack aviation to interdict movements. The Arab Spring left much of the Sahel 
ungoverned. In this space, typified by vast desert expanses and semi-arid grasslands, AQIM 
planned and executed their smuggling and kidnapping operations. The desert offered 
refuge because AQIM found allies among the local tribes and their training and detention 
camps were beyond the reach of any government power. This equation fundamentally 
changed when the French, equipped with Reaper unmanned drones and modern aircraft, 
identified and destroyed these facilities with minimal collateral damage. 172 They were no 
longer beyond the reach of any government, and the desert terrain proved to be a suitable 
backdrop for illuminating the location and disposition of AQIM equipment and personnel. 
Despite these vulnerabilities, AQIM has proven adept at maintaining revenue streams 
through kidnap for ransom operations. If European nations pay ransom fees to AQIM, they 
will maintain a valuable source of revenue, and interdiction of other revenue streams leads 
to an intensification of kidnapping as a sure way to fill AQIM’s coffers.173 
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In June 2014, the MNLA, the MIA, and Malian government signed an agreement 
to allow the Malian army to return to Kidal and hold presidential elections. The Tuareg 
abandoned their objective of an independent Azawad and renounced extremism. AQIM 
and MUJAO, still operated in the region, but they wielded significantly less influence 
among the Tuareg dominated regions. Ansar al-Din, after negotiating with the Algerian 
government in December of 2012, agreed to renounce extremism and release western 
hostages. This agreement was later condemned by Iyad Ag Ghali, the Tuareg leader of 
Ansar al-Din, but the resultant fracturing of the once powerful jihadist organization through 
an appeal to Tuareg concerns left the organization significantly diminished in capacity. 
These observations confirm that a viable path to negotiated settlement is normally 
characterized by political aspirations and a preference for economic and political 
pragmatism rather than fundamentalism. On the other hand, purely jihadist organizations 
are irreconcilable but their influence can be minimized through diplomatic cooptation of 
the portions of the population that are reconcilable. Furthermore, the resources of jihadist 
organizations are more vulnerable to interdiction. The disposition of AQIM led to a loss of 
support among the people. AQIM relied on the people to provide active and tacit support, 
allow storage of weapons and equipment, and to not cooperate with the intervention force 
or government authorities. Imposition of sharia law and a foreign interpretation of Islam 
cost AQIM the support of the people and compromised weapons caches, locations of 
fighters and leadership, and put stress on the support networks that were then identified 
and disrupted by French aircraft and intelligence collection.    
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVENTION 
In the case of Mali, French forces were required to participate directly in ground 
combat and the neighboring states played a significant role in the containment of the 
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conflict and the negotiations that occurred before, during, and after. The Malian regime’s 
inability to defend its own borders, and the growing threat of jihadist expansion into north 
Africa, necessitated an initially robust intervention. The role of French forces in this 
operation is distinct from the role of US forces in the Philippines, and the contrast provides 
for useful observations. Mali’s neighbors, Algeria in particular, were central to legitimizing 
the French intervention and marginalizing the influence of the jihadist forces operating in 
Mali. 
Intervention Overview 
The French intervened in Mali to secure Bamako, end the jihadist insurgency, and 
restore the territorial integrity of the Malian state. Within a few months of the decision to 
intervene, French troops fractured the insurgency and relentlessly pursued AQIM, forcing 
jihadists to flee into the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains or leave Mali altogether. The capital 
city of Bamako was more secure than it had been in recent years, and the territorial integrity 
of Mali was restored under the control of a French and Malian coalition.174 The French 
achieved this with a combat force consisting of 4 combined arms groups known as GTIAs 
1, 2, 3, and 4 (equivalent of US Army battalions of approximately 800 men each) that were 
combined from disparate forces stationed in Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, and France at the time. 
These units were assembled on the road to Bamako on short notice, and their success is a 
testament to the expeditionary spirit of the French army. Success in Operation Serval came 
at a cost of 8 French soldiers and 647 million euro.175 By any reasonable standard, the 
French overcame significant friction and achieved a resounding success in their war against 
Islamic extremism in Africa. 
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Role of French Forces 
Operation Serval was conducted in four distinct phases. The first phase consisted 
of operations to block the insurgency and prevent its spread south of the Niger river. During 
this phase, GTIA 1 seized a bridge at Markala to enable a future attack on Timbuktu, 
Malian forces with French advisors seized the city of Konna and another company of GTIA 
1 seized the airfield at Sevare.176  These operations contained the jihadist advance and 
enforced the Niger river as the temporary border. Simultaneously, French special 
operations forces carried out attacks on insurgents to prevent an effective insurgent 
counterattack and disrupt the enemy in depth.177  
The second phase consisted of the liberation of Gao and Timbuktu. African forces 
relieved the French from their blocking positions along the Niger river and the French 
forces attacked north in two columns, one toward Gao and the other towards Timbuktu. At 
Timbuktu, a French force of 250 paratroopers conduct a night combat jump to seize an 
airfield and prevent the escape of insurgents. The following day the main force arrived and 
enemy contact was nil. Likewise, at Gao special operations forces seized the airfield and 
linked up the following day with the ground force. By the 28th of January both Timbuktu 
and Gao were under French control. 178 Gao and Timbuktu both became hubs for force 
projection to pursue the remnants of AQIM in later phases.  
The third phase was the pursuit of AQIM into the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains. By 
January 30th, additional forces had arrived from France and sufficient combat power was 
assigned to establish security in Gao and Timbuktu. The French continued their pursuit of 
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AQIM and this required additional airfields and operational hubs. French special 
operations forces conducted an airfield seizure at Kidal, in the foothills of the Adrar des 
Ifoghas mountains where remnants of AQIM sought refuge.179 The following week on 
February 8th the process was repeated at Tessalit airfield, providing the French with the 
necessary tactical infrastructure to support medical evacuation, refuel and re-arm attack 
helicopters, and provide a secure location for mission preparation and recovery. These 
bases enabled French forces to operate on foot in the mountains for weeks at a time, 
clearing valleys of insurgents and weapons caches with continuous close air support. They 
encountered suicide bombers, crude improvised explosive devices (IEDs), continuous 
small arms fire, and frequent ambushes.180 In the Ifoghas, French and Chadian forces 
combined to kill an estimated 400 jihadists and seize 130 tons of materiel.181  
Also during the third phase, French forces were engaged in persistent conflict with 
the MUJAO in Gao. Intelligence suggested approximately 100 fighters in the region. 
French forces focused on winning the support of the residents and developing intelligence 
networks. The MUJAO continued to press the French forces, conducting attacks on the 5th, 
8th, and 10th of February and a larger attack on the 21st. Patience and intelligence work paid 
off on the 28th, when French forces conducted an attack on MUJAO forces holed up in a 
wadi outside of Gao, killing 54 of them. All told, French forces would kill another 200 
jihadists and seize another 75 tons of equipment in fighting in and around Gao.182  
The final phase consisted of the integration of the UN mission with African support 
and drawdown of French forces to a sustainable long term commitment. By April, there 
were approximately 5,000 French forces in Mali and the French were eager to avoid an 
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African quagmire. The first troops to enter Mali were rotated back to France and by July, 
the French had reduced the footprint to 3,200. On April 25, the UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali was created with the following mandate:  
 
The mission would stabilize key population centers, support state-administration 
countrywide, support security sector reconstruction, develop disarmament 
programs, support national dialogue efforts, support presidential elections, protect 
civilians under imminent threat of violence, support humanitarian work, help 
preserve Mali’s national culture, and support national and international justice.”183  
The UN authorized a force of 12,640 security forces to be drawn mostly from Chad with a 
budget of $800 million per year.184 The fight is far from over, but Operation Serval 
delivered a devastating blow to the prospects of AQIM in the region. 
The role of French forces in Operation Serval is undeniably beyond the scope of an 
observer/trainer mission. The French initially acted unilaterally on behalf of a state that 
lacked both the capacity and legitimacy to conduct a classic counterinsurgency operation. 
This operation clearly assumed great risk by committing to ground combat with such 
minimal force, so why did it succeed? My assumption is that when an intervening force 
acts on behalf of a state that lacks legitimacy and the capacity to provide security for its 
people, the intervening force will fight an uphill battle to establish itself as legitimate. If 
the president is viewed as illegitimate, then any power that intervenes on his behalf is at 
risk of being viewed as illegitimate as well. The intervening force risks being associated 
with leaders who may commit atrocities or simply lack the capacity to make use of the 
resources received. This begs the question, was this operation merely a short term tactical 
success? What potential is there for ensuring long term strategic success? The answer to 
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these questions is best understood through an examination of the French relationship with 
Mali’s neighboring states. 
Role of Neighboring States 
The French engaged in a broad regional strategy that included the support of Mali’s 
neighbors. French efforts to ensure a coherent regional response, and patience with hesitant 
allies in the region, paid dividends for their strategy. I argue that Algeria, not France, acted 
as the regional diplomatic power to provide a framework for the containment of terrorist 
organizations. The French intervention would carry little regional legitimacy if the 
Algerians could not be brought on board, but Algiers was determined to negotiate a 
settlement without French or American intervention.185 In December of 2012, the Algerian 
strategy appeared to be working. Ansar al-Din and the MNLA negotiated with Algiers to 
renounce terrorism and secure the areas of Mali that were currently under their control and 
release western hostages. The ensuing rejection of the resolution by Iyad ag Ghali, the 
Tuareg leader of Ansar al-Din, and jihadist attack on the Malian village of Mopti caused a 
shift in the Algerian attitude toward French intervention, and the Algerians threw their 
support behind the French calls for action, thus legitimizing the intervention and refuting 
accusations of French neocolonialism.186 The French intervention was further legitimized 
by the encouragement of Mahamadou Issoufou, the president of Niger, and many other 
African presidents who urged president Hollande to move quickly to destroy the 
insurgency.187 The French experienced great difficulty convincing the EU and the US of 
the threat to regional stability posed by the situation in Mali, but France’s African allies 
were unanimous, after Algeria’s change of heart, on the need for intervention.188  
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Algeria not only legitimized the actions of the French, but also provided a 
framework for a long-term containment strategy for AQIM. Prior to the Arab Spring, 
Algeria engaged in a delicate balancing act. Regional cooperation with Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya yielded promising results by containing AQIM. The Algerian 
Army successfully interdicted AQIM personnel and weapons attempting to enter Algeria 
from ungoverned spaces in Mali. As I mentioned in the background of this conflict, 
Algerian forces successfully interdicted 1,200 AQIM jihadists and killed another 250. The 
Algerian strategy had paid dividends before the events of the Arab Spring. Despite the 
constitutional limitations of the Algerian government, the commitment to regional 
collaboration on matters of counterterrorism had a profound effect.189 
CONCLUSION 
French military superiority, Algerian diplomatic engagement and support for the 
intervention, and the willingness of the other African neighboring states to support the 
intervention created the conditions under which a military intervention was viewed as 
legitimate. Among the heads of state, there was a shared sense of urgency and acceptance 
that France’s action was in the best interest of the region. This shared notion of necessity 
and justice legitimized the intervention and ultimately elicited the cooperation necessary 
to secure a negotiated settlement with the reconcilable elements of the insurgency. 
The Malian regime lacked both capacity and legitimacy. The government was 
unable to provide basic services due to a lack of resources and institutional capacity. The 
military was poorly equipped and incapable of providing security for the people. Decades 
of political exclusion and corruption fueled the separatist ambitions of the Tuareg, who 
seized an opportunity when large numbers of Tuareg fighters returned to Mali after the 
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collapse of the Qaddafi regime. There was strong potential for a meaningful negotiated 
settlement with the MNLA, due to the political and economic nature of the MNLA’s 
grievances as well as the secular perspective of the organization. AQIM, MUJAO, and the 
remnants of Ansar al-Din maintain a regional jihadist agenda that precludes negotiated 
settlement, particularly as these organizations engage in kidnapping for ransom and 
smuggling activities in the ungoverned regions of North Africa. AQIM has proven 
vulnerable to resource interdiction. French and Chadian forces seized more than 2,000 tons 
of weapons and multiple munitions caches. The terrain of northern Mali leaves AQIM 
vulnerable to the technological advantages of western intelligence collection. The French 
forces assumed the role of administrator, acting unilaterally to destroy AQIM. African 
allies were quick to provide troops, but the French forces did not cede any responsibilities 
for planning or provision of resources, choosing instead to dictate the tempo of the 
operations until the territorial integrity of Mali was restored. Algiers proved to be an 
indispensable ally for the French. Despite the colonial history, Algeria consented to French 
intervention and legitimized the actions. Furthermore, the deft diplomatic acumen of 
Algiers provides a framework for a regional containment strategy that compensates for 
Mali’s lack of capacity and legitimacy. In the case of Mali, the strength of neighbors and 
competent coalition building by a key western partner with vastly superior military 
capabilities created opportunity for success. The future of Operation Serval is in the hands 
of the Algerians and the French.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This paper focused on two small footprint operations, the US intervention in the 
southern Philippines as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and the French intervention 
in Mali to defeat a collection of Islamist extremists. These two cases provide two starkly 
different approaches to small footprint operations. Both cases demonstrate the centrality of 
legitimacy and the potential for third party interveners to legitimate negotiation and 
connect increased capacity to real gains in perceptions of legitimacy. Recognizing the 
centrality of legitimacy, the other factors analyzed in this study provide additional 
information for understanding the context of these interventions and why two distinct 
models both yielded a positive result. I will articulate a distillation of my findings with 
regard to each area of analysis. 
 Institutional capacity is a strong determinant of the counterinsurgency strategy 
selected by the regime. These two case studies are consistent with Stephen Watts’s 
hypothesis in Countering Other’s Insurgencies. In each case, the improved capacity of the 
regime brought about changes in strategy. The GRP adapted its strategy from the brutality 
of the Marcos era to eventually adopt a classical counterinsurgency model that emphasized 
development and security over destruction of insurgent forces.190 In the case of Mali, the 
lack of institutional capacity led the government to decentralize authority. This 
decentralization, rather than strengthening the political inclusion of the Tuareg, left Tuareg 
leaders dependent on patronage and susceptible to corruption and cooptation.191 In this 
environment of low capacity, to say nothing of the military’s lack of resources, one 
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thousand well-armed Tuareg fighters from Libya were able to drastically alter the balance 
of power and plunge the nation into war.192 What distinguishes Mali from the Philippines 
is that in Mali the lack of government capacity was not remedied by improved governance, 
rather it was rectified directly by a third-party intervention. In the Philippines, the improved 
governance preceded the intervention. In the case of Mali, the intervention was necessary 
in an environment of low capacity. This is a valuable distinction that has ramifications for 
US policy. This shatters the notion that the OEF-Philippines model can be directly applied 
to future interventions and highlights the significance of context. Understanding the limits 
of the current regime, and the relationship between capacity and legitimacy, informs the 
composition and role of the intervention force. This invokes an understanding of the war 
we’re in and not attempting to impose an ill-fitting model of intervention. This leads us to 
the next factor of governance under consideration, legitimacy. 
 These two case studies indicate crises of legitimacy. Legitimacy is quantified in 
this paper through various indicators of political inclusion, trust in institutions, and 
evaluating evidence of shared notions of justice and consent to authority within the host 
nation’s formal jurisdiction. However, these factors are insufficient to answer the question 
of how to legitimize a regime. In both cases, the government in question could not generate 
legitimacy solely through its actions. Intervention brings to light additional questions of 
legitimacy. Can an illegitimate regime host a legitimate intervention on its behalf? The 
insight of these case studies is that legitimacy can be established through intervention by 
outside actors under the right conditions. Both cases demonstrate that the incorporation of 
regional partners who share ethnic or religious ties with the insurgency, endorse the 
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intervention, and possess legitimate and functioning institutions can heavily influence the 
the possibility of negotiation in favor of peaceful resolution. 
Legitimacy in the Philippines was not established directly through actions of the 
GRP, but through effective mediation and coercion. The GRP appealed to Malaysia to 
bring the MILF to the table. This alone was not enough. The MILF saw an opportunity 
with renewed American interest in Southeast Asia, and they appealed directly to president 
Bush. These two events taken together, the GRP imploring a largely Muslim neighbor to 
mediate a domestic dispute and the MILF tying American support for the GRP to a 
contingent expectation of peaceful resolution of the Moro question, effectively bound both 
parties to the path of peace. In this, the increasingly capable GRP found legitimacy with 
the Moro people. Both parties came to see the other as legitimate and support for the 
counterinsurgency strategy enabled the isolation and destruction of more extreme 
elements. Capacity preceded legitimacy, and legitimacy required outside actors solicited 
by the belligerents for its establishment. 
The Malian government also suffered from a crisis of legitimacy. The interim 
president, presiding over the government temporarily until democratic elections could be 
held, did extend an invitation to the French to intervene. The Bamako government was in 
no position to legitimize the intervention. The unique insight of the French operation is that 
legitimacy was conferred on the intervention by regional power-brokers and international 
institutions. This is extraordinarily relevant to US policy, as in the case of both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, regime changes occurred which precluded the sanction of the host nation at 
the onset of the intervention. I do not imply a consistent parallel of the US led interventions 
in those countries with the French led intervention in Mali. I merely imply that legitimizing 
an intervention is critical to the eventual success of the intervention and should be a 
consideration at the onset. The French intervention in Mali is instructive as to how 
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legitimacy can be generated under such conditions, and provides insight as to when it is 
unreasonable to assume that legitimacy can be established.  
The French employed a comprehensive diplomatic and military strategy to 
legitimize their actions. First, they sought the approval of the UN Security Council and 
achieved a resolution authorizing force. The UNSCR ensured that the international 
community viewed intervention as a necessity, given the conditions in Mali. Second, the 
French secured support from the European Union to support a long-term training program 
to build the capacity of the Malian army. By doing this, the French ensured that France 
alone would not bear the costs of training and equipping a Malian force. Third, the French 
gained the support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This 
was crucial during the intervention. Nearly 12,000 Chadian troops participated in the 
operation and they acquitted themselves with valor, particularly in the Adrar des Ifoghas 
mountains where 26 Chadians were slain in a pitched battle with AQIM.193 Chadian 
involvement ensured a regional commitment to stability inside of Mali. In addition to the 
Chadian contributions, the French were encouraged by Morocco and Mauritania to 
intervene. This regional buy-in was crucial to legitimizing the intervention. Fourth, the 
French did not intervene until Algeria approved of the intervention.194 This is absolutely 
critical to the legitimacy of the intervention. Algeria occupied a critical position as a 
regional power-broker. Algeria hosted negotiations between the various separatist groups 
and the Malian government, and even secured concessions from Ansar al-Din prior to the 
French intervention. When Ansar al-Din’s leadership rejected the agreement and the 
insurgents attacked south of the Niger River, the Algerians signaled approval for the French 
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intervention. Algerian support was the linchpin to establishing French legitimacy. The 
support from Algiers ensured that accusations of French Neocolonialism would fall on deaf 
ears, and communicated to the international community that the regional powers trusted 
French intentions.   
In both of these cases, legitimacy was conferred on the interventions through the 
approval of external actors. This finding is not universal, and cannot be extrapolated to all 
future interventions. Legitimacy can be derived, it can be conferred, but it cannot be 
manufactured. Intervening forces can increase the institutional capacity of regimes, and 
this may, eventually, establish conditions wherein legitimacy can be established, but to do 
this requires a significant commitment in terms of time and resources. Iraq serves as an 
example of enhancing capacity without necessarily enhancing legitimacy. The apex of the 
Iraqi government’s legitimacy occurred during the Sunni awakening, when events outside 
of the government’s and the intervening force’s control brought people together to address 
a common problem. But regardless of how much the US increased the capacity of the Iraqi 
government, the US could not make the government legitimate. Legitimacy is 
extraordinarily delicate, and these interventions provide insight into the conditions under 
which intervention can address a crisis of legitimacy.  
The path to a negotiated settlement is determined by locating the insurgency’s 
central aim. My research has identified two different categories for identifying this. The 
first category is political.  Political aims consist of rights to ancestral domain, self-
determination, economic development, and freedom from persecution. For the Moro 
people, the GRP historically denied these things. The MILF was formed to advance the 
cause of Moro independence to achieve these political goals. Likewise, the Tuareg in Mali 
declared independence for Azawad because of the failure of the Malian regime to represent 
Tuareg interests. Tuareg aims were rooted in political grievances for greater autonomy and 
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self-determination. The second category of insurgency is transnational jihadist. In the case 
of the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group remained a transnational jihadist organization. 
The ASG sought to transform the Philippines into a Wahabbist state governed by sharia 
law. This group was funded, trained, and supported by international terrorist organizations. 
In Mali, AQIM, Ansar al-Din, and MUJAO all represent groups governed by jihadist 
ideology. There are no concessions that can satisfy these groups, and they must be either 
eliminated or contained. Groups in this category do not present a path to a negotiated 
settlement, but these groups are historically more vulnerable to interdiction and destruction. 
Stated another way, identifying the insurgency’s center of gravity is crucial to 
determining whether a path to negotiated settlement is viable. If the center of gravity is 
rooted in concrete realities under the supposed jurisdiction of the government, then there 
is room to negotiate. The Moro people sought greater political inclusion and regional 
autonomy. These are concrete concepts that, under the right conditions, will be negotiated 
for. If the center of gravity is located in a grand ideological vision of world dominance, 
then the government has no legitimate claim to negotiate with the aspirations of the group. 
The government cannot submit itself to a vision of world-domination without violating its 
mandate of political inclusion of other groups. In this case, the center of gravity is beyond 
the purview of the government and if the insurgency seeks to establish itself inside the 
physical jurisdiction of the government, the government has no choice but to eradicate the 
group in question. 
VULNERABILITY TO INTERDICTION 
There are two primary factors that determine the vulnerability of an insurgency to 
interdiction. The first factor is disposition: how the insurgency is arrayed and how the 
insurgency sustains itself. Disposition falls into two broad categories. The first is locally 
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sustained. The MILF is an example of a locally sustained organization.MILF leadership is 
well established and military commands are assigned to specific sectors. Because the MILF 
is an indigenous separatist movement, the insurgency is able to locally resource much of 
what it needs. The second general category of disposition is a network. AQIM, MUJAO, 
and ASG are all network based organizations. AQIM relies on ungoverned spaces to 
establish necessary contacts, plan, and prepare for operations. Resources are frequently 
transferred from one group to another. Network based organizations are transnational and 
are not resourced locally. In the case of Mali, AQIM was frequently interdicted moving 
weapons and supplies to support fighters in Algeria. In the case of AQIM and the ASG, 
much of their funding is derived through kidnap for ransom operations. These methods of 
resourcing require much greater risk than national separatist movements that draw their 
support directly from the people. Additionally, these types of activities draw the attention 
of powerful western nations who are incentivized to intervene to protect their citizens. 
Network organizations attempt to build the relationships to garner local support, 
but this requires the dispensation of services or other goods, and this consumes resources 
that locally resourced insurgencies can channel towards weapons and war materiel. 
Network based groups are at the mercy of their hosts to provide active and tacit support for 
their operations. Whereas a locally supported disposition allows for greater organization 
and preservation of resources, assuming the organization does not need to compete for the 
tacit support of the population. This distinction is significant, as it often exists within the 
confines of various nations. Both types of organizations operate in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and distinguishing between the two general categories enables the host nation and the 
intervening force to determine who is reconcilable and who must be destroyed. 
The second factor that determines vulnerability to interdiction is the terrain. The 
southern Philippines is severely restricted terrain. Much of Mindanao is outside of the 
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effective jurisdiction of the GRP, and dense tree cover obscures intelligence collection and 
facilitates a prolonged guerrilla campaign. This has strengthened the position of the MILF, 
and may be what encouraged the GRP to pursue reconciliation rather than annihilation in 
the first place. Successful interdiction of resources in this type of environment requires 
significant military capacity, and it is simply beyond the reach of most governments 
managing these crises. Intervening forces can, however, provide the needed additional 
capabilities that can reduce the effectiveness of restrictive terrain. Examples of this include 
the US intervention in Afghanistan where American troops established combat outposts 
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to deny the use of restrictive terrain for trafficking 
of illicit materiel as well as Taliban fighters. The Afghan government lacked the capacity 
to interdict these resources, but strategically placed troops and sustained surveillance can 
deny the advantage of restrictive terrain to insurgencies.  
ROLE OF INTERVENING STATE AND NEIGHBORS 
Small footprint operations can implement the observer, trainer, or administrator 
roles. The US operation in the Philippines provides a textbook small footprint operation. 
All operations were conducted by, with, and through the GRP to enable the host nation to 
become more capable and legitimate. This didn’t occur simply because of American 
adherence to principle. What guaranteed the relegation of US troops to an observer/trainer 
role was the insistence of the GRP. The GRP could insist on a non-combat role because, 
comparatively speaking, the GRP was a highly capable government. This is an anomaly of 
intervention, not the norm, and should be understood as an ideal that is rarely attained. In 
contrast, the French intervention in Mali entailed participation in direct combat. This 
clearly violates the assumption that small footprint operations require an abstinence from 
direct action. However, in defense of the French strategy, the intervention in Mali 
 95 
employed a model of aggressive ground combat to decisively and rapidly defeat an 
insurgent force, followed by a regionally sourced peacekeeping force to build capacity and 
secure the major population centers. French audacity put the enemy to flight and created 
the breathing room necessary for the Malian government to reorganize and rebuild. This 
was done with a commitment to a long term regional peace strategy that included 
development projects through the World Bank and an EU commitment to provide training 
and resources for the Malian defense forces. Commitment to a less invasive model would 
have cost the French and the Malians dearly, in terms of lives, time, and treasure. What 
enabled the French to cross this boundary of direct action? I argue that it was the legitimacy 
conferred on France through the role of Mali’s neighboring states who understood the 
nature of the threat. These two interventions provide dramatically different approaches in 
this regard, and both approaches, given the underlying conditions, were both small 
footprint and successful in achieving their intention. 
In sum, small footprint strategies are highly contingent on a variety of factors for 
their success. The small footprint models detailed in this paper are not broadly applicable, 
yet they do inform strategies for dealing with low-intensity conflict. Nothing in this 
research obviates the need for a strong and capable military. There is no substitute for 
strength. However, when the conditions permit the advancement of US foreign policy goals 
through small footprint intervention, policymakers would be wise to recognize the 
contextual limitations of such strategies outlined in this paper and the inherent challenges 
to legitimizing both the intervention and the host nation. 
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